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Domain Extenders for UOWHF: A Finite Binary Tree Algorithm

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Abstract: We obtain a *finite* binary tree algorithm to extend the domain of a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF). The associated key length expansion is only a constant number of bits more than the minimum possible. Our finite binary tree algorithm is a practical parallel algorithm to securely extend the domain of a UOWHF. Also the speed-up obtained by our algorithm is approximately proportional to the number of processors.
Key Words: UOWHF, hash function, binary tree.
Category: E.3, Data Encryption.

1 Introduction

Universal one-way hash functions (UOWHF) were introduced in [5] by Naor and Yung to prove that secure digital signatures can be based on one-way, 1-1 functions. A UOWHF is a family of functions $\{h_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{K}}$ for which the following task of the adversary is computationally infeasible. The adversary has to choose a x from the domain, is then given a random $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and subsequently has to find a y such that $x \neq y$ but $h_k(x) = h_k(y)$. Intutively, a UOWHF is a weaker primitive than a collision-resistant function, since the task of the adversary is more difficult, i.e., the adversary has to commit to the string x before knowing the actual hash function h_k for which the collision has to be found. Simon [10] has shown that there is a oracle relative to which UOWHFs exist but collision resistant hash functions do not exist. See [6] for a survey on hash functions and [11] for some properties and reductions between different kinds of hash functions.

The study of UOWHF was later undertaken by several authors. Bellare and Rogaway [1] showed that it is possible to build practical and provably secure "hash-then-sign" schemes, where the hashing is done using a UOWHF. The paper also addresses the problem of constructing UOWHFs. Like most basic cryptographic primitives it is virtually impossible to define a family $\{h_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{K}}$ and prove it to be a UOWHF. The idea suggested in [1] is to use one of the standard hash functions like SHA or RIPEMD in a keyed mode and assume it

to be a UOWHF. It seems more reasonable to make this assumption when the domain is a short string rather than an arbitrarily long string. This leads to the question of extending the domain of a UOWHF while preserving the UOWHF property.

The Merkle-Damgård algorithm [2, 3] is a well known method of extending the domain of a collision-resistant hash function. However, as shown in [1] this method does not work in the case of a UOWHF. Several constructions for extending the domain of a UOWHF is presented in [1]. These constructions assume the existence of a UOWHF $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$, with $h_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$ and show how to construct a UOWHF $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ where the input to H_p can be a very long message. The constructions have an associated key length expansion of $|p| - |k|$. One of the major goals in extending the domain of a UOWHF is to *minimise* the expansion of the key length.

Shoup [9] provides a modification of the Merkle-Damgård algorithm to extend the domain of a UOWHF. The Merkle-Damgård construction and hence the Shoup construction is a sequential algorithm. A tree based scheme for extending the domain of a UOWHF was presented in [1]. For binary trees the scheme can be used to hash a message of length $L = 2^T(n-m)-(n-2m)$ using a full binary tree of height T and $2^T - 1$ processors, where the base UOWHF takes as input a message of length n and produces a digest of length m. The key length expansion made by the algorithm is $2m(T-1)$. In a recent work [7], an improved binary tree based construction has been presented which makes a key length expansion of $m(T + \lfloor \log(T-1) \rfloor)$ bits for $T \geq 2$. The main disadvantage of both the above binary tree algorithms is that the number of processors grows with the length of the message. See Table 1 in Section 6 for a comparison of different algorithms.

We obtain a binary tree algorithm for which the key length expansion is a constant number of bits more than the minimum possible. This is made possible by using a *finite* binary tree of processors in contrast to [1, 7] where the height of the binary tree increases with the length of the message. Thus our algorithm yields a *practical* parallel algorithm for securely extending the domain of a UOWHF. Another important consequence of using a finite binary tree is the fact that for moderately long messages the speed-up over sequential (Shoup's) algorithm is equal to the number of processors. Thus our algorithm makes efficient use of resources. We note that the speed-up obtained in [1, 7] is logarithmic in the number of processors.

The finite binary tree algorithm is built using ideas from several existing work. The basic algorithm has been used to extend the domain of a collision resistant function in [8]. To this algorithm we add the masking techniques of [9] and [7]. The masking technique of [7] is itself built around the masking techniques of [9] and that of [1]. We show that all these techniques fit together nicely to provide a correct domain extender for UOWHFs.

2 Preliminaries

Let $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ be a keyed family of hash functions, where each $h_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$. Consider the following adversarial game.

1. Adversary chooses an $x \in \{0,1\}^n$.
2. Adversary is given a k which is chosen uniformly at random from $\mathcal{K}$.
3. Adversary has to find y such that $y \neq x$ and $h_k(x) = h_k(y)$.

A strategy $\mathcal{A}$ for the adversary runs in two stages. In the first stage $\mathcal{A}^{\text{guess}}$, the adversary finds the x to which he has to commit in Step 1. It also produces some auxiliary state information σ. In the second stage $\mathcal{A}^{\text{find}}(x,k,\sigma)$, the adversary either finds a $y \neq x$ such that $h_k(x) = h_k(y)$ or it reports failure. Both $\mathcal{A}^{\text{guess}}$ and $\mathcal{A}^{\text{find}}(x,k,\sigma)$ are probabilistic algorithms. The success probability of the strategy is measured over the random choices made by $\mathcal{A}^{\text{guess}}$ and $\mathcal{A}^{\text{find}}(x,k,\sigma)$ and the random choice of k in Step 2 of the game. We say that $\mathcal{A}$ is an (ϵ,a)-strategy if the success probability of $\mathcal{A}$ is at least ϵ and it invokes the hash function h_k at most a times. In this case we say that the adversary has an (ϵ,a)-strategy for $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$. We say that $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ is a universal one way hash family (UOWHF) if the adversary has a negligible probability of success with respect to any probabilistic polynomial time strategy.

In this paper we are interested in extending the domain of a UOWHF. Thus given a UOWHF $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$, with $h_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$ and a positive integer L, we would like to construct another UOWHF $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$, with $H_p : \{0,1\}^L \to \{0,1\}^m$. We also consider the following situation. Given a UOWHF $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ where $h_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$, we construct a UOWHF $\{H^*_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ where $H^*_p : \cup_{i=1}^{2^{n-m}}\{0,1\}^i \to \{0,1\}^m$. Since we require $n \geq 2m$, we have $n - m \geq m$. For practical applications m is at least 64 bits, hence messages upto length 2^{64} can be hashed by H^*_p. This is sufficient for any conceivable purpose.

We say that the adversary has an (ϵ,a)-extended strategy for $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ if there is a strategy $\mathcal{B}$ for the adversary with probability of success at least ϵ and which invokes the hash function h_k at most a times. Note that H_p is built using h_k and hence while studying strategies for H_p we are interested in the number of invocations of the hash function h_k.

The correctness of our construction will essentially be a Turing reduction. We will show that if there is an (ϵ,a)-extended strategy for $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$, then there is an (ϵ_1,a_1)-strategy for $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$, where a_1 is not much larger than a and ϵ_1 is not significantly less than ϵ. This will show that if $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ is a UOWHF, then so is $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$.

The key length for the base hash family $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ is $\lceil \log_2 |\mathcal{K}| \rceil$. On the other hand, the key length for the family $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ is $\lceil \log_2 |\mathcal{P}| \rceil$. Thus increasing the size of the input from n bits to L bits results in an increase of the key size by an

amount $\lceil \log_2 |\mathcal{P}| \rceil - \lceil \log_2 |\mathcal{K}| \rceil$. From a practical point of view a major motivation is to minimise this increase in the key length.

3 Known Algorithms

We briefly discuss sequential and binary tree based domain extending algorithms for UOWHFs.

3.1 Sequential Algorithm

The Merkle-Damgård construction [3, 2] is a well known construction for extending the domain of a collision resistant hash function. However, Bellare and Rogaway [1] showed that the construction does not directly work in the case of UOWHF. In [9], Shoup presented a modification of the MD construction. We briefly describe the Shoup construction.

Let $\{h_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{K}}$, $h_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$, $\mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^K$ be the UOWHF whose domain is to be extended. Let x be the input to H_p with $|x| = n + r(n-m)$. We define $p = k||\mu_0||\mu_1||\ldots||\mu_{l-1}$ where $l = 1 + \lfloor \log r \rfloor$ and μ_i are m-bit binary strings called masks. The increase in key length is lm bits. The output of H_p is computed by the following algorithm. For integer i, define $\nu(i) = j$ if $2^j | i$ and $2^{j+1} \not| i$.

Algorithm SeqUOWHF

1. Let $x = x_0||x_1||x_2||\ldots||x_r$, where $|x_0| = n$ and $|x_i| = n - m$ for $1 \leq i \leq r$.
2. Define $z_0 = h_k(x_0)$.
3. For $1 \leq i \leq r$, define $s_i = z_{i-1} \oplus \mu_j$ and $z_i = h_k(s_i||x_i)$ where $j = \nu(i)$.
4. Define z_r to be the output of $H_p(x)$.

For the sake of simplicity we do not include an initialisation vector. The function h_k is invoked $(r+1)$ times and the algorithm requires $\lceil \log_2(r+1) \rceil = 1 + \lfloor \log_2 r \rfloor$ masks. This algorithm was initially described in [9] and in [4] it was shown that the number of masks required is the minimum possible for any such sequential construction to be correct.

3.2 Tree Based Algorithm

Extending the domain of a UOWHF using a full binary tree of processors have been considered in the literature [1, 7]. A full binary tree of $2^T - 1$ processors numbered $P_1, \ldots, P_{2^T-1}$ is used. The length of the message x to be hashed is $|x| = L = 2^{T-1}n + (2^{T-1} - 1)(n - 2m)$. Let $\mathcal{T}_T = (V_T, A_T)$ be the full binary tree of $2^T - 1$ processors, where $V_T = \{1, \ldots, 2^T - 1\}$ and $A_T = \{(i, \lfloor (i/2) \rfloor) : 1 < i < 2^T\}$. We set $a_i = (i, \lfloor (i/2) \rfloor)$ and so $A_T = \{a_2, \ldots, a_{2^T-1}\}$. There is a set M of m-bit masks and a function $\psi : A_T \to M$, which assigns an m-bit string

to each arc of $\mathcal{T}_T$. The algorithms of [1] and [7] have the same general form and differ only in the description of M and ψ. We first describe the general form of the algorithm.

Algorithm TreeUOWHF

1. Write $x = x_1||x_2||\ldots||x_{2^T-1}$, where $|x_1| = \ldots = |x_{2^{T-1}-1}| = n - 2m$ and $|x_{2^{T-1}}| = \ldots = |x_{2^T-1}| = n$.
2. For $i = 2^{T-1}, \ldots, 2^T - 1$, do in parallel
   $z_i = h_k(x_i)$.
   $s_i = z_i \oplus \psi(a_i)$.
3. For $j = T - 1$ downto 2 do
   For $i = 2^{j-1}$ to $2^j - 1$ do in parallel
   $z_i = h_k(s_{2i}||s_{2i+1}||x_i)$.
   $s_i = z_i \oplus \psi(a_i)$.
4. Output $h_k(s_2||s_3||x_1)$ as the output of $H_p(x)$.

To complete the description of Algorithm 1 we have to define M and ψ. We do this separately for [1] and [7].

Bellare and Rogaway [1] : In this case $M = \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{T-1}, \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_{T-1}\}$ and $\psi(a_i)$ is defined as follows: $\psi(a_i) = \alpha_{T+1-l}$ if $i \equiv 0 \bmod 2$; and $\psi(a_i) = \beta_{T+1-l}$ if $i \equiv 1 \bmod 2$. Here $l = level(i)$, i.e., $2^{l-1} \leq i \leq 2^l - 1$.

Sarkar [7] : In this case $M = \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{T-1}, \beta_0, \ldots, \beta_{r-1}\}$ where $r = 1 + \lfloor \log_2(T-1) \rfloor$ and $\psi(a_i)$ is defined as follows: $\psi(a_i) = \beta_{\nu(T+1-l)}$ if $i \equiv 0 \bmod 2$; and $\psi(a_i) = \alpha_{T+1-l}$ if $i \equiv 1 \bmod 2$. Here again $l = level(i)$.

Note that the Bellare-Rogaway algorithm requires $2(T-1)$ masks whereas Sarkar's algorithm requires $T + \lfloor \log_2(T-1) \rfloor$ masks.

4 Finite Binary Tree Algorithm

Let $\{h_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{K}}$, $h_k : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ be a UOWHF whose domain is to be extended. *For our finite binary tree algorithm we require* $n \geq 2m$. A set of 2^t processors $P_0, \ldots, P_{2^t-1}$ will be used in the algorithm. Define $\delta(t) = 2^t n + (2^t - 1)(n - 2m) = 2^t(2n - 2m) - (n - 2m)$ and $\lambda(t) = 2^{t-1}n + 2^{t-1}(n - 2m) = 2^{t-1}(2n - 2m)$. The message x is of length $|x| = L$. We assume that $L \geq \delta(t)$. Otherwise we choose a $t' \in \{1, \ldots, t-1\}$, such that $L \geq \delta(t')$ and use only $2^{t'}$ of the 2^t processors. We define $\mathcal{I} = \{0, \ldots, 2^{t-1} - 1\}$, $\mathcal{L} = \{2^{t-1}, \ldots, 2^t - 1\}$.

We first define three parameters $q_t(L), r_t(L)$ and $b_t(L)$. If $L > \delta(t)$, then $q_t(L)$ and $r_t(L)$ are defined by the following equation:
$L - \delta(t) = q_t(L)\lambda(t) + r_t(L)$, where $r_t(L)$ is the unique integer from the set $\{1, \ldots, \lambda(t)\}$. If $L = \delta(t)$, then $q_t(L) = r_t(L) = 0$. Define $b_t(L) = \lceil (r_t(L)/(2n - 2m)) \rceil$. *We will usually write* q, r *and* b *instead of* $q_t(L), r_t(L)$ *and* $b_t(L)$ *respectively.*

The message x is padded with $b(2n-2m)-r$ many 0's to ensure that the length becomes $\delta(t)+q\lambda(t)+b(2n-2m)$. The maximum number of 0's that are padded is $(2n-2m)-1$ and is independent of the message length. The algorithm goes through $R=q+t+2$ rounds. In round 1, each processor gets an n-bit substring of the message x as input and produces an m-bit output. Also in rounds 2 to R and for $2^{t-1} \leq i \leq 2^t-1$, each processor P_i gets as input either an n-bit substring of the message x or the empty string $\langle\rangle$ and correspondingly produces as output either an m-bit string or the empty string $\langle\rangle$.

For $1 < j \leq R$ and $0 \leq i \leq 2^{t-1}-1$, in round j processor P_i reads the outputs of processors P_{2i} and P_{2i+1} in round $j-1$. Thus the same set of processors is used in each round. However, for convenience of description of our algorithm, we will consider R copies of the set of processors, denoted by $P_{i,j}$, $0 \leq i \leq 2^t-1$ and $1 \leq j \leq R$. Thus we consider a directed graph $\mathcal{D}=(V,A)$, where $V=\{P_{i,j} : 0 \leq i \leq 2^t-1, 1 \leq j \leq R\}$ and

$$A = \bigcup_{0 \leq i \leq \tau} \bigcup_{1<j\leq R} \{(P_{2i,j-1}, P_{i,j}), (P_{2i+1,j-1}, P_{i,j})\}$$

where $\tau = 2^{t-1}-1$. Since the outdegree of each vertex of $\mathcal{D}$ is at most one, we label the arcs as $A_{i,j}$ $(0 \leq i \leq 2^t-1,\ 1 \leq j \leq R-1)$, where $A_{i,j} = (P_{i,j}, P_{\lfloor (i/2) \rfloor, j+1})$. For $0 \leq i \leq 2^{t-1}-1$ and $1 \leq j \leq R-1$, we denote by $z_{i,j}$ the m-bit string which is the output of processor $P_{i,j}$. It is assumed that $z_{i,j}$ is associated with the arc $A_{i,j}$. Let M be a set of m-bit masks and $\psi : A \to M$ be an assignment of these masks to the arcs of the processor graph $\mathcal{D}=(V,A)$.

Each of the processors $P_{i,j}$ is given a string $u_{i,j}$ as input. For $1 \leq j \leq R-1$, define $\mathsf{UList}_j = \langle u_{0,j}, \ldots, u_{2^t-1,j} \rangle$ and U_j to be the concatenation of all the strings in UList_j. The strings U_j's are obtained from the message and $x = U_1 || \ldots || U_{R-1} || U_R$, where the lengths of the strings $u_{i,j}$'s and U_R is defined as follows. (See [8] for correctness of this formatting algorithm.)

$$|u_R| = \begin{cases} n-2m \text{ if } b>0; \\ 0 \qquad \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$|u_{i,j}| = \begin{cases} n & \text{if } (j=1) \text{ or } (2 \leq j \leq q+1 \text{ and } i \in \mathcal{L}); \\ n & \text{if } j=q+2 \text{ and } 2^{t-1} \leq i \leq 2^{t-1}+b-1; \\ 0 & \text{if } j=q+2 \text{ and } 2^{t-1}+b \leq i \leq 2^t; \\ 0 & \text{if } q+2<j<R \text{ and } i \in \mathcal{L}; \\ n-2m & \text{if } 2 \leq j \leq q+2 \text{ and } i \in \mathcal{I}; \\ n-2m & \text{if } q+2<j<R \text{ and } 0 \leq i \leq K_j-1; \\ 0 & \text{if } q+2<j<R \text{ and } K_j \leq i \leq 2^{t-1}-1. \end{cases}$$

Here $K_j = 2^{s-1}+k_s$, where $s=R-j$ and $k_s = \left\lfloor \frac{2^{t-s-1}+b-1}{2^{t-s}} \right\rfloor$. For $0 \leq i \leq 2^t-1$ and $1 \leq j \leq R-1$, the strings $z_{i,j}$'s are either m-bit strings or the empty string.

If $z_{i,j}$ is an m-bit string, then define

$$s_{i,j} = z_{i,j} \oplus \psi(A_{i,j}), \tag{1}$$

We are now in a position to define the parallel UOWHF algorithm (PUA).

Parallel UOWHF Algorithm PUA(t, x)

(a) **Case 1** $(j = 1$ **and** $0 \leq i \leq 2^t - 1)$ **:** $z_{i,1} = h_k(u_{i,1})$.

(b) **Case 2** $(j > 1$ **and** $2^{t-1} \leq i \leq 2^t - 1)$ **:**

$$\begin{cases} z_{i,j} = h_k(u_{i,j}) & \text{if } |u_{i,j}| = n; \\ \quad = \langle\rangle & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

(c) **Case 3** $(j > 1$ **and** $0 \leq i \leq 2^{t-1} - 1)$ **:**

$$\begin{cases} z_{i,j} = h_k(s_{2i,j-1} || s_{2i+1,j-1} || u_{i,j}) & \text{if } |u_{i,j}| = n - 2m; \\ \quad = z_{2i,j-1} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

(d) **return** $z_{0,R}$.

end PUA

Note that for each j $(1 \leq j \leq R)$, all the processors $P_{i,j}$ can operate in parallel to produce the strings $z_{i,j}$.

4.1 Definition of M and ψ

Algorithm PUA depends on the set of masks M and the map $\psi : A \to M$. Here we present our set of masks and our definition of ψ. Recall that $\nu(i) = j$ if $2^j | i$ and $2^{j+1} \not| i$. Also $l = level(i)$ is such that $2^{l-1} \leq i \leq 2^l - 1$. The set of masks M is the union of two disjoint sets of masks M_0 and M_1 defined as follows: $M_0 = \{m_0, \ldots, m_{c-1}\}$, where $c = 1 + \lfloor \log_2(R-1) \rfloor$; $M_1 = \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t, \beta_0, \ldots, \beta_{d-1}\}$, where $d = 1 + \lfloor \log_2(t-1) \rfloor$. Thus $|M| = 2 + t + \lfloor \log_2(R-1) \rfloor + \lfloor \log_2(t-1) \rfloor$. The assignment of masks to the arcs is defined in the following manner.

$$\begin{aligned} \psi(A_{i,j}) &= m_{\nu(j)} && \text{if } i = 0; \\ &= \alpha_{t+1-l} && \text{if } i \equiv 1 \bmod 2,\ l = level(i); \\ &= \beta_{\nu(t+1-l)} && \text{if } i > 0 \text{ and } i \equiv 0 \bmod 2,\ l = level(i). \end{aligned}$$

The assignment actually consists of two parts. In the first part, arcs of the type $A_{0,1}, A_{0,2}, \ldots, A_{0,R-1}$ are assigned masks according to the Shoup algorithm (see Section 3.1). The rest of the arcs are divided into rounds. Arcs A_{i,j_1} and A_{i,j_2} get the same mask for $i > 0$ and $1 \leq j_1, j_2 \leq R-1$. The arcs for a fixed round are assigned masks using the algorithm of Sarkar from Section 3.2. Thus the mask assigment algorithm combines the mask assignment algorithms of [9] and [7].

4.2 Definition of $\{H_p\}_{p \in \mathcal{P}}$

The UOWHF family $\{H_p\}_{p \in \mathcal{P}}$ is defined from the hash family $\{h_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{K}}$ using algorithm PUA(t, x) in the following manner.

$$H_p(x) = \text{PUA}(t, x). \tag{2}$$

Here $p = k || \tilde{M}$, where $\tilde{M}$ is the concatenation of all the masks used by PUA(t, x).

4.3 Coping with Different Size Trees

The output of $H_p(x)$ depends on the parameter t which is the depth of the processor tree. Thus the output can be correctly recomputed only if the receiver has access to a binary tree of 2^t processors. This is clearly an undesirable situation. The way out of this situation is to have an algorithm where it is possible to simulate a binary tree of 2^t processors with a binary tree of $2^{t'}$ processors for any t' in $\{0, \ldots, t-1\}$. In fact, it is possible to perform such a simulation. For collision resistant hash functions the simulation algorithm has been presented in [8]. The same algorithm will also work in the case of UOWHF. Hence we do not present the simulation algorithm in this paper.

4.4 Speed-Up Over Sequential Algorithm

The number of invocations of h_k depends on the length of the message length L. Let $\eta(L)$ denote the number of invocations of h_k for a message of length L. Then $\eta(L) = \eta(L + b_t(L)(2n - 2m) - r_t(L))$. The value of $\eta(L)$ has been computed in [8] and is given by $\eta(L) = (q_t(L) + 2)2^t + 2b_t(L) - 1$. The same value also applies to the present case.

As shown in [8], $\eta(L)$ is also the number of invocations required in the sequential algorithm. The number of parallel rounds is $q_t(L) + t + 2$. Hence compared to the sequential construction, the tree construction is faster by a factor of $\mathsf{SF} = \frac{\eta(L)}{q+t+2} = \frac{(q+2)2^t+2b-1}{q+t+2}$. If $b > 0$, then $\mathsf{SF} \geq \frac{2^t(q+2)}{q+2+t} = \frac{2^t}{1+\frac{t}{q+2}}$. The parameter q grows linearly with the length of the message whereas t is fixed. Hence for moderately large messages, the speed-up is almost linear in the number of processors.

5 Security Reduction for $\{H_p\}_{p \in \mathcal{P}}$

Theorem 1. *If there is an (ϵ, N)-extended strategy for $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$, then there is an $(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta(L)}, N + 2\eta(L))$ strategy for $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$, where $h_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$ and $H_p : \{0,1\}^L \to \{0,1\}^m$. Consequently, if the family $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ is a UOWHF, then the family $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ is also a UOWHF.*

Proof. Our proof is a reduction. We assume that there is an (ϵ, a)-extended strategy $\mathcal{B}$ for the family $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ and construct an $(\frac{\epsilon}{\eta(L)}, N + 2\eta(L))$ strategy $\mathcal{A}$ for the family $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$. Thus if $\{H_p\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ is not a UOWHF then $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ is also not a UOWHF. The contrapositive of this statement gives us the desired result. We now turn to the actual reduction. The strategy $\mathcal{A}$ has two parts, $\mathcal{A}^{\text{guess}}$ and $\mathcal{A}^{\text{find}}$. The algorithm $\mathcal{A}^{\text{guess}}$ is as follows.

1. Run $\mathcal{B}^{\text{guess}}$ to obtain a string x of length L and state information σ_1.

2. Randomly choose an I, J $(0 \leq I \leq 2^t - 1, 1 \leq J \leq R)$ such that the string $u_{I,J} \neq \langle\rangle$.
3. If $|u_{I,J}| = n$, then set $w = u_{I,J}$.
4. If $|u_{I,J}| = n - 2m$, then randomly choose two m-bit strings w_0, w_1 and set $w = w_0||w_1||u_{I,J}$.
5. Output string w and state information $\sigma = (\sigma_1, I, J)$.

After $\mathcal{A}^{\text{guess}}$ produces an n-bit output w, the adversary is given a random $k \in \mathcal{K}$. Now the adversary runs the algorithm $\mathcal{A}^{\text{find}}$ given below.

1. If I and J are such that $|u_{I,J}| = n$, then define all the masks in M randomly.
2. If $I = 0$, then run mask defining algorithm MDEF 1 to define all the masks in M.
3. If $I > 0$, then run mask defining algorithm MDEF 2 to define all the masks in M.
4. Let $\tilde{M}$ be the concatenation of all the masks in M and set $p = k||\tilde{M}$.
5. Run $\mathcal{B}^{\text{find}}(x, p, \sigma_1)$ to obtain string x'.
6. Run algorithm PUA on x' and store all the intermediate values $u'_{i,j}$, $z'_{i,j}$ and $s'_{i,j}$.
7. If $|u_{I,J}| = n$, $w = u_{I,J} \neq u'_{I,J}$ and $z_{I,J} = z'_{I,J}$, then return $u_{I,J}$ and $u'_{I,J}$.
8. If $|u_{I,J}| = n - 2m$, $w = w_0||w_1||u_{I,J} \neq s'_{2I,J-1}||s'_{2I+1,J-1}||u'_{I,J}$ and $z_{I,J} = z'_{I,J}$, then return w and $s'_{2I,J-1}||s'_{2I+1,J-1}||u'_{I,J}$.
9. Else return failure.

The task of the mask defining algorithms is to define the masks so that the input to processor $P_{I,J}$ is the string w. If $|u_{I,J}| = n$, then $w = u_{I,J}$ and so the masks are defined randomly. On the other hand, if $|u_{I,J}| = n - 2m$, then $w = w_0||w_1||u_{I,J}$, where w_0 and w_1 are m-bit random strings. In this situation, we would like to have $w_0 = s_{2I,J-1}$ and $w_1 = s_{2I+1,J-1}$. However, the algorithm $\mathcal{B}^{\text{find}}$ produces the string x before knowing the key p. The key p can only be determined after the key k becomes known. Thus after k is revealed, the masks in M are defined so that $w_0 = s_{2I,J-1}$ and $w_1 = s_{2I+1,J-1}$. The key for the algorithm $\mathcal{B}^{\text{find}}$ is then determined to be $k||\tilde{M}$. While defining the masks we must ensure that each mask is chosen according to the uniform distribution on the set of m-bit strings. We now describe the two mask defining algorithms.

The algorithm MDEF 1 does the following. First it randomly defines the masks $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{t-1}$. Then it does a partial run of the algorithm PUA in the following manner. It operates each processor $P_{i,j}$ for $i > 0$ and $1 \leq j \leq R$. (Note that since the masks $m_0, \ldots, m_{c-1}$ are as yet undefined, it is not possible to operate $P_{0,j}$ for any j.) This partial execution of the algorithm defines all the

strings $z_{1,J}$ for $1 \leq J \leq R$. MDEF 1 now defines $\alpha_t = w_1 \oplus z_{1,J-1}$. Once α_t is defined, all the strings $s_{1,j}$ can be defined, since $s_{1,j} = z_{1,j} \oplus \psi(A_{1,j}) = z_{i,j} \oplus \alpha_t$. Now we consider the operation of $P_{0,1}, P_{0,2}, \ldots, P_{0,R}$ to be a sequential operation. For $j > 1$, the inputs to $P_{0,j}$ are $s_{0,j-1}, s_{1,j-1}$ and $u_{0,j}$. Of these the inputs $s_{1,j-1}$ and $u_{0,j}$ are already known. So we have to define the inputs $s_{0,j-1}$ for $j \geq 1$. Moreover, we have to ensure that $s_{0,J-1} = w_1$. This is exactly the problem for the sequential construction of UOWHF given in Section 3.1. Now the mask defining algorithm presented in [4] is used to correctly define the masks $m_0, \ldots, m_{c-1}$.

The first step of Algorithm MDEF 2 is to randomly define the mask α_t and the masks $m_0, \ldots, m_{c-1}$. Let $L = level(I)$. There are two cases to consider: (a) $L \leq J$ and (b) $L > J$. We first describe Case (a).

In Case (a) we have $L \leq J$ and no processor $P_{i,j}$ with $j < J - L$ will be used in defining the masks in $M_1 \setminus \{\alpha_t\}$. In this situation, for $i \geq 1$, we merge all processors $P_{i,j}$ for $J - L \leq j \leq J$ into a single processor P_i. Then the algorithm becomes the binary tree based UOWHF algorithm of Sarkar described in Section 3.2. The mask defining algorithm of [7] is used to properly define the masks in this case.

In Case (b), it will not be possible to descend L steps in the tree starting from $P_{I,J}$. After J steps we will reach round 1. The mask defining algorithm of [7] uses the algorithm of [4] along certain paths in the full binary tree. In this case such paths will not be complete. However, it is not difficult to verify that this makes the task of mask definition easier. The details are quite straightforward and hence are omitted.

Thus in both Cases (a) and (b) it is possible to properly define the masks in the set M. Further, any mask is either chosen to be random or is obtained by XOR with a random string. Hence each mask is chosen independently and uniformly at random from the set of all m-bit strings, which shows that $\tilde{M}$ is a random string.

To complete the proof we need to lower bound the probability of success. Supppose that x and x' produce a collision for H_p. Then using a backward induction it is possible to prove that for some I_1, J_1, processor P_{I_1,J_1} must produce a collision for h_k. (Details of this backward induction for collision resistant function can be found in [8].) The probability that $(I, J) = (I_1, J_1)$ is $\frac{1}{\eta(L)}$. Since the probability that x and x' provide a collision for H_p is at least ϵ, it follows that the success probability for finding a collision for h_k is at least $\frac{\epsilon}{\eta(L)}$. Strategy $\mathcal{B}$ invokes h_k at most N times and strategy $\mathcal{A}$ invokes h_k at most $2\eta(L)$ additional times. □

6 Comparison to Previous Algorithms

In Table 1 we compare the performance of the different known algorithms with PUA. The comparison is for messages of length $L = 2^T(n-m) - (n-2m)$ with

Parameter	Seq. [9]	[1]	[7]	PUA
# processors	1	$2^T - 1$	$2^T - 1$	2^t
# masks	T	$2(T-1)$	$T + \lfloor \log(T-1) \rfloor$	$\simeq \Gamma(T,t)$
speed-up	1	$\frac{2^T}{T}$	$\frac{2^T}{T}$	$\Delta(T,t)$

Table 1: Comparison of domain extenders for UOWHF. Here $\Gamma(T,t) = T + 2 + \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor$ and $\Delta(T,t) = \frac{2^t}{1+2^{t-T}(t+2)}$.

$T > 2$. The parameters n and m are constant and hence L grows as T grows. For the purpose of comparison we assume that Algorithm PUA uses 2^t processors where t is a constant less than $T-1$. Table 1 clearly shows the superiority of PUA over previous binary tree algorithms in terms of key expansion and efficiency of speed-up.

6.1 Comparison of Key Length Expansion

The key length expansion is m times the number of masks used. Hence it is sufficient to compare the number of masks used by the different algorithms. First we compare the number of masks used by Algorithm PUA to the number of masks used by Algorithm SeqUOWHF.

Theorem 2. *Let x be a message of length L and N_1 be the number of masks required by Algorithm* PUA *to hash x. Further, let N_2 be the lower bound on the number of masks required by any algorithm in $\mathcal{A}$ to hash x. Then*

$$\log\left(1 + \frac{t-2}{q+3}\right) < N_1 - N_2 - \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor < 2 + \varepsilon + \log\left(1 + \frac{t-1}{q+2}\right)$$

where $\varepsilon \ll 1$, and t is the height of the binary processor tree used by PUA.

Proof. From Section 4.1, we have $N_1 = 2 + t + \lfloor \log(R-1) \rfloor + \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor$.

For Algorithm SeqUOWHF, the number of masks used is $N_2 = 1 + \lfloor \log(r-1) \rfloor$, where r is the number of times the hash function h_k is invoked. The number of times the hash function h_k is invoked by PUA is $\eta_t(L) = (q+2)2^t + 2b - 1$ (see Proposition 4.4). Also it has been proved in [8] that this is the number of times the hash function h_k will be invoked by SeqUOWHF. Hence $N_2 = 1 + \lfloor \log(\eta_t(L) - 1) \rfloor$. Thus

$$\begin{aligned} N_1 - N_2 &= (2 + t + \lfloor \log(R-1) \rfloor \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor) \\ &\quad -(1 + \lfloor \log(\eta_t(L) - 1) \rfloor) \\ &= (2 + t + \lfloor \log(q+t+1) \rfloor + \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor) \\ &\quad -(1 + \lfloor \log(2^t(q+2) + 2b - 2) \rfloor) \end{aligned}$$

The parameter b is either 0 or equal to $\lceil \frac{r}{2n-2m} \rceil$, where r ranges from 1 to $\lambda(t) = 2^{t-1}(2n-2m)$. Hence $0 \leq b \leq 2^{t-1}$. Thus we have $1+\lfloor \log(2^t(q+2)-2) \rfloor \leq N_2 \leq 1 + \lfloor \log(2^t(q+3)-2) \rfloor$. From this we get $\log(2^t(q+2)-2) < N_2 \leq 1 + \log(2^t(q+3)-2)$. We can write this as $t+\log(q+2)-\varepsilon < N_2 \leq t+1+\log(q+3)-\sigma$ where $\varepsilon = -\log(1 - \frac{1}{2^{t-1}(q+2)})$ and $\sigma = -\log(1 - \frac{1}{2^{t-1}(q+3)})$. Clearly, $\varepsilon, \sigma \ll 1$. Thus we have

$$1 + \lfloor \log(q+t+1) \rfloor - \log(q+3) + \sigma \leq N_1 - N_2 - \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor$$

and

$$N_1 - N_2 - \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor < 2 + \varepsilon + \lfloor \log(q+t+1) \rfloor - \log(q+2).$$

This gives

$$\log\left(1 + \frac{t-2}{q+3}\right) < N_1 - N_2 - \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor < 2 + \varepsilon + \log\left(1 + \frac{t-1}{q+2}\right)$$

which is the required result. □

The height t of the binary tree is independent of the message length and is a constant for a particular implementation. For moderately long messages, Algorithm PUA requires at most $\lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor + 2$ more masks than the minimum possible number of masks. Consequenly PUA makes only a *constant* amount of key length expansion compared to the best algorithm in the class $\boldsymbol{\mathcal{A}}$.

We now compare the number of masks used by PUA to the number of masks used by TreeUOWHF. For TreeUOWHF we use the mask assignment procedure used by Sarkar [7] (see Section 3.2) and not the assignment procedure used by Bellare and Rogaway [1]. This is because the number of masks required in the first case is less than the number of masks required in the second case.

Theorem 3. *Suppose x is a message of length $L = 2^T(n-m) - (n-2m)$ and* TreeUOWHF *uses a processor tree of height $T > 2$ to hash x. Suppose* PUA *is used to hash x using a processor tree of size $t < T-1$. Let A and B be the number of masks used by* TreeUOWHF *and* PUA *respectively. Then $A - B > \lfloor \log(T-1) \rfloor - \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor - 2 - \left\lfloor \log(1 + \frac{t-2}{2^{T-t}}) \right\rfloor$.*

Proof. The number of masks used by TreeUOWHF is $A = T + \lfloor \log(T-1) \rfloor$ for $T > 2$ (see [7]). The parameters q and r of PUA are determined as follows: $L - \delta(t) = (2^T - 2^{t+1})(n-m) = q2^t(n-m) + r$, where $q = 2^{T-t} - 3$ and $r = \lambda(t)$. The number of masks required by PUA is $B = 2+t+\lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor + \lfloor \log(q+t+1) \rfloor = 2 + t + \lfloor \log(t-1) \rfloor + \lfloor \log(2^{T-t} + t - 2) \rfloor$.

Note that $\log(2^{T-t} + t - 2) = T - t + \log(1 + \frac{t-2}{2^{T-t}})$. Using this in B, we get the required result. □

Note that the parameter T grows with the length of the message while t is a constant. Hence the difference $A - B$ grows with the length of the message, which means that compared to TreeUOWHF, algorithm PUA becomes more and more efficient as the length of the message grows.

7 Variable Length Inputs

Given a UOWHF $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$, where $h_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$, we construct a UOWHF $\{H_p^*\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$, where $H^* : \cup_{i=1}^{L}\{0,1\}^i \to \{0,1\}^m$. This can handle variable length messages with maximum length 2^{n-m}. Since we require $n \geq 2m$, we have $n - m \geq m$. Practical digests must be at least 64 bits long and hence $\{H_p^*\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ can handle messages of maximum length 2^{64} which is sufficient for any conceivable purpose. We note that [1] provides a method for tackling variable length inputs based on the use of two keys.

The definition of $\{H_p^*\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ is based on Algorithm PUA. Suppose Algorithm PUA uses a binary processor tree of height t and a set of masks M to extend the domain of a UOWHF $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$. Let $\tilde{M}$ be the concatenation of all the masks in M. Let $p = k||\tilde{M}$ and let x be a message of maximum length 2^{n-m}. Then $\{H_p^*\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$ is defined in the following manner:

$$H_p^*(x) = h_k(\mathsf{PUA}(t,x)||\mathsf{bin}_{n-m}(|x|)), \tag{3}$$

where $\mathsf{bin}_k(i)$ denotes the k-bit binary representation of i, $0 \leq i < 2^k$. The idea is to compute the output z of $\mathsf{PUA}(t,x)$, concatenate $|x|$ as an $(n-m)$-bit binary number to z and apply h_k to the resulting n-bit string u.

Theorem 4. *Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an (ϵ, N)-extended strategy for $\{H_p^*\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$, with*

$$H_p^* : \cup_{i=1}^{2^{n-m}}\{0,1\}^i \to \{0,1\}^m.$$

Then there is an $(\epsilon', N+N'+2)$-strategy $\mathcal{B}$ for $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$, where $\epsilon' \geq \frac{\epsilon}{\eta(2^{n-m})}$ and $N' \leq \eta(2^{n-m})$. Consequently, if $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ is a UOWHF then so is $\{H_p^*\}_{p\in\mathcal{P}}$.

Proof. We have to describe the two stages of the adversarial strategy $\mathcal{B}$ for $\{h_k\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$. The Algorithm $\mathcal{B}^{\text{guess}}$ is same as $\mathcal{B}^{\text{guess}}$ in the proof of Theorem 1. $\mathcal{B}^{\text{guess}}$ first invokes $\mathcal{A}^{\text{guess}}$ to obtain a string x of length $L \leq 2^{n-m}$ and then outputs an n-bit string u and some state information s. The adversary is then given a random $k \in \mathcal{K}$. Now the algorithm $\mathcal{B}^{\text{find}}$ has to be described. The first task of $\mathcal{B}^{\text{find}}$ is to define the masks in M as in the proof of Theorem 1. Then $p = k||\tilde{M}$ is the key for the hash function H_p^*. $\mathcal{B}^{\text{find}}$ now invokes $\mathcal{A}^{\text{find}}$ with x and p to obtain a string x'. Suppose x and x' provide a collision for H_p^* with probability at least ϵ. If $|x| \neq |x'|$, then $\mathsf{bin}_{n-m}(|x|) \neq \mathsf{bin}_{n-m}(|x'|)$ and we immediately have a collision for h_k. On the other hand, if $|x| = |x'|$, then as in the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain a collision for h_k with probability at least $\frac{\epsilon}{\eta(L)}$. Also the number of times h_k is invoked is at most N plus twice the number of times h_k is invoked to compute H_p^*. The number of times h_k is invoked to compute H_p^* is equal to one plus the number of times h_k is invoked by Algorithm $\mathsf{PUA}(t,x)$ which is equal to $1 + \eta(L)$. This gives us the required result. □

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