

## **Multilevel Steganography: Improving Hidden Communication in Networks**

**Wojciech Frączek, Wojciech Mazurczyk, Krzysztof Szczypiorski**

(Warsaw University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland

wfraczek@gmail.com, {W.Mazurczyk, K.Szczypiorski}@tele.pw.edu.pl)

**Abstract:** This paper presents multilevel steganography (MLS), which defines a new concept for hidden communication in telecommunication networks. In MLS, at least two steganographic methods are utilised simultaneously in such a way that one method's (the upper-level) network traffic serves as a carrier for the second method (the lower-level). Such a relationship between two (or more) information-hiding solutions has several potential benefits. The most important is that the lower-level method's steganographic bandwidth can be utilised to make the secret data unreadable even after the detection of the upper-level method, e.g., it can carry a cryptographic key that deciphers the steganogram carried by the upper-level method. It can also be used to provide the steganogram with integrity. Another important benefit is that the lower-level method may be used as a signalling channel to exchange information that affects the way that the upper-level method functions, thus possibly making the steganographic communication harder to detect. A prototype of MLS for IP networks was also developed, and the experimental results are included in this paper.

**Keywords:** Information hiding, Network steganography, Multilevel steganography, MLS

**Categories:** C.2.0

### **1 Introduction**

Steganography is an art and science that has been known for ages, and its main aim is to hide secret data (steganograms) in innocent-looking carriers [Petitcolas, 99]. The more commonly a carrier is used, the less likely people are to find the existence of the carrier itself an anomaly. Therefore, it is clear that using commonly used carriers is highly desirable. Moreover, the modification of the carrier caused by inserting secret data is "invisible" to a third party observer who is not aware of the steganographic procedure.

Network steganography encompasses information-hiding techniques that can be used to exchange secret data in telecommunication networks. Using steganography to add hidden messages in communication networks (which we will henceforth refer to by the term "network steganography") utilises network protocols and/or relationships between them as steganogram carriers [Jankowski, 10]. It is important to emphasise that for a third party observer who is not aware of the steganographic procedure, the exchange of steganograms remains hidden. This is possible because inserting hidden data into a chosen carrier remains unnoticeable for users not involved in steganographic communication. Thus, not only are the steganograms hidden inside the carriers (network protocols) but, because of the features of the carriers, the

existence of the secret data exchange is also hidden. For a review of network steganography methods, please refer to the survey by Zander et al. [Zander, 07].

We wish to emphasise that network steganography can be utilised by decent users to exchange covert data, e.g., to circumvent censorship [Burnett, 10], to provide a communication channel between journalists and their information sources or by companies that are afraid of corporate espionage, but it can also be used by intruders to leak confidential data or to perform network attacks [Goodin, 11], [Virus Bulletin, 11]. This is a common trade-off that requires consideration in a broader steganography context, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

Each network steganography method may be characterised by three features: first, steganographic bandwidth, which describes how much secret data we are able to send using a particular method per time unit. Second, undetectability is defined as an inability to detect a steganogram inside certain carriers. The most popular way to detect a steganogram is to analyse statistical properties of the captured data and compare them to the typical properties of that carrier. The last feature is the steganographic cost, which describes the degree of degradation of the carrier caused by the steganogram insertion procedure. The steganographic cost depends on the type of carrier; if it becomes excessive, it leads to easy detection of the steganographic method. For example, if the method uses voice packets as a carrier for steganographic purposes in IP telephony, then the cost is expressed in conversation degradation. If certain fields of the protocol header are used as the hidden data carrier, then the cost is expressed as a potential loss in that protocol's functionality.

For each method of network steganography, there is always a trade-off necessary between maximising steganographic bandwidth and still remaining undetected. A user can employ a method naively and send as much secret data as possible, but it simultaneously makes detection easier. Therefore, he/she must purposely resign from some fraction of the steganographic bandwidth in order to achieve undetectability.

Network steganography achieves security through obscurity; as long as the steganographic procedure remains unknown to third parties, it can be freely used to exchange hidden data. The problem arises when the functioning of the steganographic method is no longer secret. In such cases, anyone who is able to capture suspected traffic can extract and read the hidden information. One solution to this problem is to cipher secret messages so that in case of disclosure, they will not be readable. However, there is a question of how to exchange the cryptographic key. In overt communication, specialised key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman [Rescorla, 99] can be utilised, but this is not an option for covert transmission because such a direct connection can look suspicious. Of course, one can always send it through covert channels, where the steganogram will be exchanged, but this approach raises three serious issues:

- The cryptographic key and ciphered steganogram are sent using the same steganographic method. Thus, the detection of this method results in the discovery of the cryptographic key and the steganogram content.
- Steganographic bandwidth devoted to carrying a user's steganogram will be even more limited.
- Another issue that steganographic communication must address is how to provide verification of the steganogram's integrity after it is sent to the steganographic receiver. Usually, it will require sacrificing a fraction of the

method's steganographic bandwidth to transmit additional data as well as a specialised protocol to be able to distinguish what is sent and when.

To address the abovementioned problems, in this paper, we propose to utilise a concept of multilevel steganography (MLS), which was originally proposed by Al-Najjar for picture steganography in [Al-Najjar, 08]. The idea in Al-Najjar's paper was to embed a decoy image into the LSBs (Least Significant Bits) of the cover image, while the real secret message was hidden in the LSBs of the decoy image. Thus, the main application of MLS for digital image steganography was limited to making an extraction of the steganogram harder to perform.

We extend this concept to network steganography and redefine it to make it more general. MLS in telecommunication networks is based on combining two or more steganographic methods in such a way that one method's (the upper-level) traffic is a carrier for the other method (the lower-level). The nature of the network steganography environment, i.e., the binding of the overt communication process with a steganographic method, allows us to pinpoint some useful MLS applications that can improve hidden communications in telecommunication networks that were not considered before. The initial paper on MLS applied to IP networks was published by the authors in [Frączek, 11]. This work significantly extends that initial paper with the following contributions:

- We provide detailed analyses of the potential MLS applications that can improve hidden communication in telecommunication networks, e.g., by providing means for cryptographic key exchange and/or steganogram integrity verification. Both these issues, as mentioned above, are still challenges for network steganography.
- We develop a proof-of-concept prototype implementation of two-method MLS for VoIP environment to prove that it is feasible.
- We present experimental results based on the MLS implementation to prove that it is useful for certain MLS applications provided above.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of multilevel steganography and its most important features. Section 3 describes, from our point of view, the most important applications of MLS. Section 4 first presents the implementation of MLS, as well as experimental results. Finally, Section 5 concludes our work.

## 2 Multilevel steganography description and features

Multilevel steganography is a new concept of information hiding in telecommunication networks that uses features of an existing steganographic method (the upper-level method) to create a new one (the lower-level method). The idea of a simple two-method MLS, in which two steganographic methods are utilised as described above, and a comparison to the typical single-method network steganography method is presented in Fig. 1.

In typical single-method network steganography, overt communication traffic is used as a carrier for secret data. By modifying the carrier, a certain steganographic bandwidth ( $B_S$ ), which is defined as the amount of the steganogram transmitted using

a particular method in one second ([b/s]), is achieved. However, the utilisation of  $B_S$  may result in a certain steganographic cost ( $C_S$ ) that expresses an impact (degradation) of a hidden data carrier due to steganographic procedure operations (see Section 1). The higher the value of  $B_S$  for a given steganographic method we want to utilise, the higher the value of  $C_S$ , i.e., the hidden data carrier is more degraded by the steganographic method. If  $C_S$  is excessive, then the detection of the method can be straightforward. Thus, a trade-off between  $B_S$  and  $C_S$  is always necessary.




Figure 1: The typical network steganography method (left) and the two-method MLS (right) comparison

As mentioned in Section 1, MLS is based on at least two steganographic methods. First, the upper-level method uses overt traffic as a secret data carrier. Second, the lower-level method uses the network traffic related to the upper-level method as a carrier (not the upper-level steganogram as was originally introduced by Al-Najjar [Al-Najjar, 08]). The indirect carriers for lower-level methods are still packets from overt communication, but the direct carrier is another (upper-level) method.

For the MLS case presented in Fig. 1, the upper-level method affects the carrier by introducing a certain cost  $C_{SU}$ , and under this condition, it achieves  $B_{SU}$ . The lower-level method relies on the upper-level method for its steganographic bandwidth  $B_{SL}$ . For this reason, the lower-level method can influence the upper-level method by introducing a cost  $C_{SL}$ , but it also can influence the overt communication by introducing a cost  $C'_{SL}$ . The cost  $C'_{SL}$  depends on the choice of the lower-level method and but potentially the lower-level method can have no influence on the carrier, i.e., it introduces no cost ( $C'_{SL} \approx 0$ ).

## 2.1 General MLS scenario

In a more general scenario, MLS may be based on more than two steganographic methods; thus, more than two levels may be created (see Fig. 2, right). In Fig. 2, the MLS consists of 3 levels, so we use the term Level 1 (or 2 or 3) steganographic method rather than upper- or lower-level to refer to each of them. Level 0 is considered to be the overt channel. Of course, on each level, more than one steganographic method may be utilised; however, it may quickly degrade the carrier

quality and thus make easy detection possible. The construction of an MLS has certain benefits compared to the scenario in which two (or more) unrelated steganographic methods are simultaneously utilised on the same carrier (Fig. 2, left):

- In general, the total steganographic cost of the MLS can be lower (for a given number of levels) than for the same number of methods used simultaneously on the same carrier (especially for the case where  $C_{S_{k0}} \approx 0$  where  $k > 1$  is a number of levels in MLS).
- The detection of MLS is harder to perform because only the discovery of the higher-level method can lead to the detection of the lower-level methods.

There is a direct binding between the steganographic methods used for MLS construction. If some additional data are carried in lower-level methods, this is a direct indication that it can be used for the benefit of the higher-level method.




Figure 2: General MLS case and simultaneous utilisation of multiple steganographic methods comparison

Thus, the entire steganographic bandwidth for MLS ( $B_{S-MLS}$ ) from Fig. 2 (right) can be expressed as

$$B_{S-MLS} = \sum_{n=1}^k \sum_{m=1}^{l_n} B_{S_{nm}} \quad , \quad (1)$$

where  $k$  is the number of levels,  $l_n$  is the number of steganographic methods used at level  $n$  and  $B_{S_{nm}}$  is the steganographic bandwidth of method  $m$  at level  $n$ . If we assume that only one method can be used at each level, then Formula (1) can be simplified to

$$B_{S-MLS} = \sum_{n=1}^k B_{S_n} \quad , \quad (2)$$

where  $B_{S_n}$  is the steganographic bandwidth of the method at level  $n$ .

The total cost, under the assumption that a lower-level method is not imposing a cost on an upper-level one that would limit the bandwidth of the upper-level method, is equal to

$$C_{S-MLS} = \sum_{n=1}^k \sum_{o=1}^{l_n} \sum_{m=0}^{n-1} \sum_{p=1}^{l_m} C_{S_{nomp}} \quad , \quad (3)$$

where  $k$  is the number of levels,  $l_n$  is the number of steganographic methods used at level  $n$  and  $C_{S_{nomp}}$  is impact (cost) of method  $o$  at level  $n$  on the method  $p$  at level  $m$ . Level 0 is the level of overt communication, and  $l_0=1$  because there is only one overt channel. After reaching the threshold  $T$ , the steganographic method is easy to detect; thus, it is advised that  $C_{S-MLS}$  should always be below it. In an ideal situation, the value of  $C_{S_{nomp}}$  is equal to 0 for  $n>1$ , which means that methods at levels below 1 have no impact on the upper-level ones or on the overt communication, and the total cost depends only on the level 1 methods. As in the formula for steganographic bandwidth, if we assume that only one method can be used at each level, then Formula (3) can be simplified to

$$C_{S-MLS} = \sum_{n=1}^k \sum_{m=0}^{n-1} C_{S_{nm}} \quad , \quad (4)$$

where  $C_{S_{nm}}$  is the impact (cost) of the method at level  $n$  on the method at level  $m$ .

It is our view that a two-method MLS is the most realistic scenario for network steganography and that finding an MLS scheme with more than two levels with satisfying steganographic bandwidth can be difficult to achieve. For this reason, in the rest of the paper, we limit our considerations to a two-method-based MLS unless otherwise stated (and thus we use the terms upper- and lower-level methods when we refer to only two of them).

## 2.2 MLS features and hidden communication scenarios

MLS, in general, has two important features. First, the bandwidth of the lower-level method is a fraction of the bandwidth of the upper-level method. This is similar to the relationship between overt communication bandwidth and upper-level steganography bandwidth (Fig. 3). The more redundancy and complexity in overt communication, the more hidden data can be inserted and exchanged covertly.




Figure 3: Upper- and lower-level steganographic bandwidth

Second, the lower-level method is potentially harder to detect than the upper-level one. This results from the fact that the lower-level method's functioning entirely depends on the upper-level one. Thus, the adversary must detect the upper-level method first in order to look for the lower-level one. Moreover, the undetectability of MLS may be the same, greater or lower than if only an upper-level method were used, depending on the choice of the upper- and lower-level methods.

The introduction of MLS also influences possible steganographic communication scenarios (Fig. 4), which were introduced in [Zander, 07]. In this paper, there are four communication scenarios, which depend on whether the sender and receiver of overt communication are the sender and receiver of overt communication or middlemen.




Figure 4: Communication scenarios in typical, single-method network steganography

In multilevel steganography, the number of communication scenarios increases to 16. Each scenario from Fig. 4 can be replaced with four new scenarios, which are presented in Fig. 5.

The upper-level method's steganogram sender and receiver in Fig. 5 are the steganography sender and steganography receiver in Fig. 4, respectively. The middlemen in Fig. 4 are network devices that are placed between the sender and receiver of the upper-level steganographic method. They have to be aware of the upper-level method in order to use it to create the lower-level method.

All known steganographic methods can presumably be used as upper-level methods. The main problem is to find a suitable lower-level method that will cooperate with the upper-level one. If we consider, for example, methods such as LACK [Mazurczyk, 08], RSTEG [Mazurczyk, 09] or the SCTP hybrid method [Fraczek, 10] as upper-level methods (which modify the packet payload to insert a steganogram), then the lower-level method can hide bits in the number of packets that the steganogram of the upper-level method sends in established time periods. For example, if a packet with the steganogram is sent during a one-second period it means binary "1"; otherwise (i.e., if the packet is sent later), it means binary "0".




Figure 5: MLS communication scenarios

### 3 MLS Applications

Multilevel steganography can be utilised to achieve various aims depending on how it will be used. Here we present several of the most interesting MLS applications, in our opinion. The benefits of MLS for hidden data exchange are summarised in Table 1. The proposed MLS applications are possible under the assumption that the upper- and lower-level hidden communication paths are the same (see Sec. 2.2).

MLS benefit	Described MLS application
Increased steganographic bandwidth for user data	Using two or more steganographic methods increases the total steganographic bandwidth achieved for user data compared with a single steganographic method.
Increased undetectability	An upper-level method controlled by information carried by the lower-level method (Sec. 3.1).
Steganogram transmission reliability	Lower-level method carrying information for steganogram integrity verification (Sec. 3.1).
Harder steganogram extraction and analysis	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cryptographic key carried by lower-level method and upper-level method steganogram ciphered (Sec. 3.1).</li> <li>2. Parts of the steganogram sent using the upper-level and others by the lower-level method (Sec. 3.3).</li> <li>3. Steganogram carried only by the lower-level method; upper-level steganogram only for masking (Sec. 3.2).</li> </ol>
Steganographic cost unchanged	In the best-case scenario, steganographic cost depends on the upper- and lower-level methods used, but it can be the same as for utilisation of the upper-level method alone.

Table 1: MLS benefits and possible applications

Let us consider the abovementioned MLS applications based on where the steganogram is inserted; there are three possible cases:

- The steganogram is carried only by the upper-level method.

- The steganogram is carried only by the lower-level method.
- The steganogram is carried by both the upper- and lower-level methods.

The rest of this section describes these cases in detail.

### 3.1 Only the upper-level method carries the steganogram

If the steganogram is only carried by the upper-level steganographic method, then the lower-level method may be utilised for special purposes. For example, it may carry a cryptographic key that was used to cipher the steganogram sent by the upper-level method (Fig. 6). Such an MLS application is possible only for steganographic communication scenarios in which the upper- and lower-level hidden communication paths are the same (compare Fig. 4 and 5). It is assumed that the steganogram was ciphered before initiating the steganographic exchange to avoid any unnecessary delays. When overt traffic is sent, so are the parts of the ciphered steganogram (upper-level method) and bits of the cryptographic key (lower-level method). After all bits of the ciphered steganogram and cryptographic key are successfully received, the steganographic receiver is ready to decipher the steganogram. If for some reason the hidden communication does not last long enough to send the whole cryptographic key, then the steganographic receiver stores the ciphered steganogram and waits for the next covert communication from this steganographic sender.




Figure 6: MLS application: lower-level method carries cryptographic key

Another application of multilevel steganography may be to use lower-level method steganographic bandwidth to verify the integrity of the steganogram carried by the upper-level method (Fig. 7). Before the steganographic exchange begins, a hash function ( $H$ ) is used to calculate a hash that is then transferred to the steganographic receiver by the lower-level method. After the hidden data transmission ends, the receiver calculates the corresponding hash on the received and extracted steganogram. Next, the locally calculated hash is compared to the received one. If they are the same, then the transmission was successful. If not, then some transmission error has occurred and the steganogram must be resent sometime in the future.

The integrity of the steganogram may also be verified in a different way if the upper- and lower-level methods are chosen properly. If we divide the steganogram carried by the upper-level method into parts and assign them sequence numbers, then the lower-level method may be used to transfer the sequence number of the corresponding part of the steganogram sent by the upper-level one.




Figure 7: MLS application: the lower-level method carries steganogram integrity information

Another interesting application of multilevel steganography is to use information carried by the lower-level method to control the way the upper-level method works. Such functionality can be helpful to limit the chance of disclosure, e.g., by changing characteristic features of the particular steganographic method during hidden data exchange (Fig. 8). Some methods allow their behaviour to be changed while transmitting steganograms. One example of such a method is the Cloak method [Luo, 07], which uses many TCP flows between a steganographic sender and receiver to enable secret communication. When using Cloak, one can modify its parameters during the steganographic data exchange. There are two parameters that can be changed: the numbers of segments ( $N$ ) and TCP flows ( $X$ ). The problem with modifying them during covert transmission is how to indicate to the steganographic receiver that these parameters have changed and that the steganogram is inserted elsewhere compared to the beginning of transmission. The solution to this problem may be MLS. When overt communication begins, the upper-level method starts to send steganograms in a predetermined mode. At the same time, the lower-level method (that can be analogous to the lower-level method provided in the prototype MLS implementation in Section 4) is utilised to transfer control information that affects the mode of the upper-level method (Fig. 8, case 1). After the lower-level method succeeds in its transmission, the steganographic receiver acknowledges reception of the new parameters, and from then on, the sender incorporates the changes into the steganographic procedure (Fig. 8, case 2). This effect, continuously repeated while the hidden data exchange lasts, makes detection more difficult.

Moreover, if the steganographic bandwidth of the lower-level steganographic method is sufficient, all of the abovementioned applications of MLS may be used at once, i.e., the lower-level method can carry both a cryptographic key as well as control information for the upper-level one. However, this requires the existence of some protocol for the lower-level method that will govern what is sent, and when, to the steganographic receiver.




Figure 8: MLS application: lower-level method as a signalling channel to control upper-level method

### 3.2 Only the lower-level method carries the steganogram

In this case, the upper-level method also carries some information, but it is not used to transfer steganograms. Its purpose is to mask the existence of the lower-level method, but it does not necessarily need any meaning (of course, the upper-level steganogram can also be utilised to provide integrity or a cryptographic key). The real steganogram is carried only by the lower-level steganographic method. If the upper-level steganographic exchange is uncovered, then the secret information will not be compromised. However, the main disadvantage of this solution is its limited steganographic bandwidth, which may limit its usage for large volumes of data.

### 3.3 Both upper- and lower-level methods carry the steganogram

More interesting than the previous case is the situation in which the steganogram is carried using the upper- and lower-level methods. There are two possibilities, based on whether or not these steganograms are related:

- The upper- and lower-level methods send separate steganograms that are not related,
- The original steganogram is divided into pieces, and some pieces are sent using the upper-level and some using the lower-level method.

In the first case, the lower-level method serves as a separate steganographic channel in which additional secret data can be exchanged. In the second case, the original steganogram is divided into two parts; the first part is sent using the upper-level method and the second part using the lower-level one (Fig. 9, case 1). The original steganogram is successfully received and can be read if it is extracted from both level methods and properly combined (Fig. 9, case 2). Such a simple operation can make

the steganogram harder for a third party observer to extract and analyse. If he/she is aware of the existence of only the upper-layer method, then he/she can extract only parts of the fragmented steganogram.




Figure 9: MLS used for divided steganogram transmission using inter-leaving

#### 4 MLS Prototype and Experimental Results

For MLS prototype development, two steganographic methods were used. As an upper-layer method, LACK [Mazurczyk, 08] was utilised. This method is intended for a broad class of multimedia, real-time applications such as IP telephony. In IP telephony, a conversation is based on exchanging RTP (Real-Time Transport Protocol) streams between calling parties. Each of the RTP packets is uniquely identified with a sequence number.

LACK utilises the fact that for usual multimedia communication protocols such as RTP, excessively delayed packets are not used for the reconstruction of transmitted data at the receiver, i.e., the packets are considered useless and discarded. The idea of LACK is as follows. At the transmitter, some selected audio packets are intentionally delayed before transmitting. If the delay of such packets at the receiver is considered excessive, the packets are discarded by a receiver that is not aware of the steganographic procedure. The payload of the intentionally delayed packets is used to transmit secret information to receivers aware of the procedure, so no extra packets are generated. For unaware receivers, the hidden data are “invisible”.

The lower-level method is based on proper RTP sequence number matching. It modifies the choice of the RTP packet (its sequence number) used for LACK purposes depending on the steganogram bits to be sent.

The functioning of the implemented MLS prototype is presented in Fig. 10. First, following the LACK method, a RTP packet is selected for steganographic purposes (1). If the RTP sequence number is not suitable for the lower-level method, then one of the neighbouring RTP packets is selected instead with a suitable sequence number (2). Next, the chosen packet is delayed at the transmitter and then sent through the communication channel to the receiver, and the original payload is replaced with the steganogram (3). At the receiver, the LACK packet was considered lost; thus, when it comes, it is not used for voice reconstruction. Instead, the payload of the RTP packet is extracted and treated as an upper-level steganogram, and based on this packet sequence number, a lower-level steganogram is also determined (4).




Figure 10: MLS prototype functioning

In the simplest case, we can assume that a LACK packet with an odd RTP sequence number means a binary “1” and an even RTP sequence number means a binary “0”. For example, if a user has to send bits “101”, then the sequence number of the first LACK packet will be odd, the sequence number of the second LACK packet will be even and the sequence number of third LACK packet will be odd. This method can be further extended to convey more than 1 bit per LACK packet. Steganogram bits can be determined by the last x bits of the sequence number of the LACK packet. Then, the bandwidth of this method is x bits/LACK packet because each LACK packet carries x bits in its sequence number. However, it is important not to change the order of RTP packets when the LACK packet is changed due to the influence of the lower-level method because it may lead to errors in the steganography data received.

#### 4.1 MLS prototype implementation

Implementation of MLS prototype was based on *MjSip* [MjSip, 12] project. It is a Java implementation of a VoIP softphone based on a SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) signalling protocol. Only the user agent application was utilised; the SIP server was omitted because it does not affect the results of experiments (the RTP streams are exchanged directly between end users, without using the SIP server). In the SIP User Agent application, a simple PLC (Packet Loss Concealment) method was implemented, as softphones usually have some way to address packet losses. PLC mechanisms are used to limit quality degradation due to packet loss – in the simplest scenario, these insert a repetition of the last received packet to substitute for a missing one [ITU-T, 88]. This PLC method was added to the SIP User Agent application.

The implementation of the upper-level method, LACK, was straightforward. For each RTP packet chosen for LACK purposes, the payload consisted of two parts: steganogram and hash. The hash is computed for the steganogram carried in that packet using the MD5 (Message Digest 5) hash function. It allows the receiver to distinguish LACK packets from normally transmitted non-steganographic ones.

Two parameters of the LACK method were affected: the probability that a packet is used for LACK purposes ( $p_{LACK}$ ) and the minimum delay of LACK packets. For each RTP packet, a pseudorandom number between 0 and 1 was generated, and it was determined whether this number was smaller than the established probability of sending a LACK packet. If this was the case, then the packet was chosen for steganographic purposes.

The implementation of the lower-level method required (if necessary) modification of the upper-level choice of LACK packet. If the upper-level method selected an RTP packet for LACK purposes whose sequence number satisfied the needs of the lower-level method, i.e., the steganogram bits to be sent, the packet is not changed. Otherwise, an RTP packet with the proper RTP sequence number is selected. The lower-level method tries to select RTP packets as close as possible to the packets originally selected by the upper-level method.

For example, let us assume that the lower-level method for carrying a steganogram utilises the two least significant bits of each RTP packet's (selected by upper-level method) sequence number. In that case, if the bits of the lower-level steganogram to be sent are "10" and the sequence number chosen for LACK purposes is odd, e.g., it is 51 (110011), then the lower-level method influences the choice by changing it to the neighbouring RTP packet with even sequence number, e.g., 54 (110110). Then, this RTP packet's payload will be replaced with the upper-level steganogram.

The main issue was to avoid changing the order of RTP packets because of a change in the LACK packets imposed by the lower-level method. The problem was solved by marking only one packet for LACK purposes at any given moment. If more than one packet was chosen to be marked for LACK purposes at the same time, then only one was marked. However, it was noted that additional packets must be sent as LACK packets. For example, if the RTP sequence number of the packet chosen by upper-level method is 51 but was changed to 54 by the lower-level method, and simultaneously, sequence number 53 was the next chosen by the upper-level method, then the packet with sequence number 53 is not considered as a LACK packet (in order not to break the rule "one packet for LACK purposes at any given moment"). After sending the LACK packet (with original sequence number 51), an additional packet is chosen for LACK purposes.

One parameter of the lower-level method that was subject to configuration was the number of lower-level bits of steganogram that are sent with each LACK packet. This parameter must be set the same for both the sender and receiver of the lower-level steganogram.

## 4.2 Experiment methodology and results

The experimental setup is presented in Fig. 11. The environment for the experiment was a LAN network, so no packets were lost or excessively delayed except

intentionally, which permitted us to evaluate the sole impact of LACK and MLS on voice quality, without any network-related or endpoint-related interferences.




Figure 11: MLS experimental setup

The conversation was recorded in advance and encoded with G.711 (each RTP packet carries 20 ms of voice using 160 bytes; the packet flow rate is 50 packets per second) and then saved as an input .wav file. The duration of the conversation was set to 9 minutes, as it has been experimentally verified that the average call duration for IP telephony is in the range 7-11 minutes [Guha, 06]. Then, parts of the .wav file were inserted into the payloads of consecutive RTP packets. Next, the RTP stream was influenced by the chosen steganographic methods:

- Only LACK, where MLS is not used – this case will be treated as a reference for MLS.
- MLS that transfers 1 bit of the lower-level method steganogram in a single LACK packet (MLS-1).
- MLS that transfers 2 bits of the lower-level method steganogram in single LACK packet (MLS-2).
- MLS that transfers 3 bits of the lower-level method steganogram in a single LACK packet (MLS-3).

In the next step, the RTP stream was sent to the receiver, which reconstructed the voice conversation and saved it to the output .wav file. Then, parts of approximately 30 s length of original (input) and degraded (output) .wav files were compared using the PESQ method [ITU-T, 01] and the MOS-LQO (Mean Opinion Score – Listening Quality Objective) value was obtained. Then, the average MOS-LQO was calculated. By performing experiments in a strictly controlled environment with no losses or excessive delays, we were able to assess the real influence of MLS on the conversation quality. For each steganographic method mentioned above, the experiment was repeated 10 times, and the average results are presented.

We decided to set the probability of selecting an RTP packet for steganographic (LACK) purposes by the upper-level method to 0.032 because it resulted in a MOS-LQO value of approximately 3.6, which is regarded as good quality compared with that achieved in PSTN networks. It also means that the cost of the upper-level method is  $C_{SU} \approx 0.7$  in the MOS scale (see Fig. 1) because the quality of the G.711-based connection without LACK is approximately 4.3.

The probability of selecting an RTP packet for steganographic purposes by the upper-level method was set identically for all experiments, but it was not always

achieved. The actual, real value of the percentage of RTP packets selected for LACK purposes could be different because of the process of generating random numbers.

For the presented experimental setup, we measured the steganographic bandwidth of upper- and lower-level methods ( $B_{SU}$ ,  $B_{SL}$ ) and the corresponding costs introduced ( $C_{SU}$ ,  $C_{SL}$ ). Obtained experimental results are presented in Table 2 and Figs. 12 and 13 (CI denotes confidence interval).

	LACK		MLS-1		MLS-2		MLS-3	
	Average	CI (95%)						
MOS-LQO	3.609	0.018	3.617	0.025	3.626	0.015	3.625	0.019
$C_{SU}$ [MOS]	$\approx 0.7$		$\approx 0.7$		$\approx 0.7$		$\approx 0.7$	
$C_{SL}$ [MOS]	N/A		$\approx 0$		$\approx 0$		$\approx 0$	
$p_{LACK}$	0.0317	0.0008	0.0323	0.0017	0.0316	0.0007	0.0315	0.0006
$B_{SU}$ [bit/s]	1827.41	48.39	1837.87	44.13	1822.08	39.20	1812.48	36.74
$B_{SL}$ [bit/s]	0.00	0.00	1.60	0.04	3.16	0.07	4.72	0.10

Table 2: Experimental results




Figure 12: Steganographic bandwidth of upper- (left) and lower-level (right) methods

The experimental results prove that for the MLS prototype presented, which uses LACK as an upper-level method, adding a lower-level steganographic method has a negligible impact on the voice quality as well as on upper-level steganographic bandwidth, thus the cost  $C_{SL} \approx 0$ . It is also worth noting that for the presented prototype implementation and chosen upper- and lower-level method,  $C_{SL} \approx 0$  because there is also no direct influence by the lower-level method on the VoIP conversation.

When LACK is used alone during an IP telephony conversation, its steganographic bandwidth is approximately 1830 bit/s; after applying MLS, it remains in the range 1810-1840 bit/s (Fig. 10, left). The difference in the LACK steganographic bandwidth comes from the fact that it was hard to obtain  $p_{LACK}$  precisely in the experiments for MLS-1, -2 and -3 (Table 2). In these circumstances, for the lower-level MLS method, a steganographic bandwidth was obtained of up to 5

bit/s (MLS-3). The voice quality scores achieved were also similar and in the range of 3.61-3.63.




Figure 13: Experimental voice quality results (MOS-LQO)

Of course, such high values of upper-level steganographic bandwidth are achieved when LACK introduces approximately 3% packet losses. In real-life IP networks, causing so many losses may have a great impact on voice quality because they are added to the network and jitter-buffer losses. For example, for G.711, the maximum packet loss acceptable is 5% (when PLC is used) [Na, 02]. Thus, if LACK is to remain undetected, the losses it introduces should be kept at a reasonable level.

However, even if fewer losses are introduced, the resulting steganographic bandwidth of the lower-level method may be sufficient for some MLS applications outlined in Table 1. Earlier experimental research for IP telephony verified that the average call duration falls in the range of 7-11 minutes [Guha, 06]. This means that for a typical 9 minute call, between 540 (MLS-1) and 2700 (MLS-3) bits can be transferred using a lower-level steganographic method. Thus, the lower-level method's steganographic bandwidth in the proposed MLS prototype is suitable for reliability of the upper-level steganogram (by carrying an integrity hash) or to carry a cryptographic key if one is needed, thus making it harder to extract and analyse an upper-level steganogram.

Obviously, the increase in total steganographic bandwidth is approximately 0.3% and not significant, thus making it hard to use applications of MLS where parts of the steganogram are sent using the upper-level method and others by the lower-level method or the steganogram is carried only by the lower-level method and the upper-level steganogram is used only for masking.

However, it must be noted that for the developed MLS prototype, the steganographic cost is unchanged when compared to the situation when only LACK is used. To conclude, the MLS applications out of those mentioned in Table 1 that may be applied in a particular case depend on the choice of the upper- and lower-level methods; different MLSs may be more suitable for different MLS applications.

## 5 Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, a new concept for performing hidden communication for network steganography, called multilevel steganography, was presented. MLS consists of at least two steganographic methods that are utilised simultaneously in such a way that one method's (called the upper-level) network traffic serves as a carrier for the second one (called the lower-level). Such a relationship between two (or more) information-hiding solutions has several potential benefits, e.g., it may provide increased steganographic bandwidth or increase undetectability. It can also be utilised for ensuring the reliability of steganogram transmission or making steganogram extraction and analysis harder to perform. These MLS applications can improve hidden communications in telecommunication networks and have not been considered before.

The MLS prototype was developed as a proof of concept. It was implemented in an IP telephony environment. It was based on a previously introduced LACK solution as an upper-level method and selecting odd/even RTP sequence numbers for LACK packets as a lower-level method. For this prototype, the steganographic cost was unchanged compared to the situation when only the upper-level method was used.

Experimental results were obtained demonstrating that some of the above-described MLS applications can be easily applied. We found that the lower-level method's steganographic bandwidth is suitable to provide reliability for the upper-level steganogram (by carrying an integrity hash) or to carry a cryptographic key that the secret data were encrypted with, thus making it harder to extract and analyse an upper-level steganogram. MLS can also be utilised to increase the upper-level method's undetectability by utilising the lower-level method's steganographic bandwidth to exchange control information between the covert parties that will influence the upper-level method's functioning.

In general, the most important decision regarding MLS is the choice of upper- and lower-level methods. In an ideal situation, the steganographic cost of the lower-level method should be equal to 0 or a very small value when compared with the steganographic cost of the upper-level one. Moreover, the higher the steganographic bandwidth of the lower-level method, the more the described MLS applications can be applied.

Our future work will be focused on developing more efficient MLS schemes because the benefits for such constructions of hidden data exchange are considerable and would solve some open challenges related to network steganography (providing steganogram reliability and cryptographic key exchange). Future work will also include analysing MLS detection options.

### Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education and Polish National Science Centre under grants: 0349/IP2/2011/71 and 2011/01/D/ST7/05054.

## References

- [Al-Najjar, 08] Al-Najjar A.J.: "The Decoy: Multi-Level Digital Multimedia Steganography Model"; Proc. of 12th WSEAS International Conference on Communications, Heraklion, Greece (2008).
- [Burnett, 10] Burnett, S., Feamster, N., Vempala, S.: "Chipping Away at Censorship Firewalls with User-Generated Content"; USENIX Security Symposium (2010), 463-468.
- [Frączek, 10] Frączek, W., Mazurczyk, W., Szczypiorski, K.: „Stream Control Transmission Protocol Steganography”; Proc. of Second International Workshop on Network Steganography (IWNS 2010) co-located with The 2010 International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking and Security (MINES 2010), Nanjing, China (2010).
- [Frączek, 11] Frączek, W., Mazurczyk, W., Szczypiorski, K.: "Multi-Level Steganography Applied to Networks"; Proc. of: Third International Workshop on Network Steganography (IWNS 2011) co-located with The 2011 International Conference on Telecommunication Systems, Modeling and Analysis (ICTSM2011), Prague, Czech Republic (2011).
- [Goodin, 11] Goodin, D.: "Duqu spawned by 'well-funded team of competent coders' - world's first known modular rootkit does steganography, too"; The Register (2011), [http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/09/duqu\\_analysis/](http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/09/duqu_analysis/).
- [Guha, 06] Guha S., Daswani N., Jain R.: "An experimental study of the skype peer-to-peer VoIP system"; Proc. Of Sixth International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (2006).
- [ITU-T, 01] "Perceptual evaluation of speech quality (PESQ): An objective method for end-to-end speech quality assessment of narrow-band telephone networks and speech codecs"; ITU-T Recommendation P.862 (2001).
- [ITU-T, 88] "Pulse code modulation (PCM) of voice frequencies"; ITU-T Recommendation G.711 (1998).
- [Jankowski, 10] Jankowski, B., Mazurczyk, W., Szczypiorski, K.: "Information Hiding Using Improper Frame Padding"; Proc. of 14th International Telecommunications Network Strategy and Planning Symposium (Networks 2010), Warsaw, Poland (2010), 77-82.
- [Luo, 07] Luo, X., Chan, E.W.W, Chang, R.K.C: "Cloak: A Ten-fold Way for Reliable Covert Communications"; Proc. of 12th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (2007).
- [Mazurczyk, 08] Mazurczyk, W., Szczypiorski, K.: "Steganography of VoIP Streams"; Proc. of 3rd International Symposium on Information Security (IS'08), Monterrey, Mexico, (2008) 1001-1018.
- [Mazurczyk, 09] Mazurczyk, W., Smolarczyk, M., Szczypiorski, K.: "Retransmission steganography and its detection"; Soft Computing Journal, 15, 3 (2011) 505-151.
- [MjSip, 12] MjSip Project website: <http://www.mjsip.org/>.
- [Na, 02] Na, S., Yoo, S.: "Allowable Propagation Delay for VoIP Calls of Acceptable Quality"; Proc. of First International Workshop, AISA 2002, Seoul, Korea, LNCS Vol. 2402/2002, (2002), 469-480.
- [Petitcolas, 99] Petitcolas, F., Anderson, R., Kuhn, M.: "Information hiding—a survey"; Proc. of I.E.E.E., 87, 7 (1999), 1062–1078.

[Rescorla, 99] Rescorla, E.: “Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method”; IETF Request for Comments: 2631 (1999).

[Virus Bulletin, 11] Virus Bulletin: “Alureon trojan uses steganography to receive commands”; (2011), URL:[http://www.virusbtn.com/news/2011/09\\_26.xml](http://www.virusbtn.com/news/2011/09_26.xml).

[Zander, 07] Zander, S., Armitage, G., Branch, P.: “A Survey of Covert Channels and Countermeasures in Computer Network Protocols”; IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 9, 3, (2007) 44-57.