Certificateless Public Key Encryption Secure against Malicious KGC Attacks in the Standard Model
Yong Ho Hwang (Software Laboratories, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Korea)
Joseph K. Liu (Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R), Singapore)
Sherman S.M. Chow (New York University, USA)
Abstract: Recently, Au et al. [Au et al. 2007] pointed out a seemingly neglected security concern for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) scheme, where a malicious key generation center (KGC) can compromise the confidentiality of the messages by embedding extra trapdoors in the system parameter. Although some schemes are secure against such an attack, they require random oracles to prove the security. In this paper, we first show that two existing CL-PKE schemes without random oracles are not secure against malicious KGC, we then propose the first CL-PKE scheme secure against malicious KGC attack, with proof in the standard model.
Keywords: certificateless encryption, malicious KGC attack, standard model