

## **A Collaborative Biomedical Research System**

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**Abstract:** The convergence of need between improved clinical care and post genomics research presents a unique challenge to restructuring information flow so that it benefits both without compromising patient safety or confidentiality. The CLEF project aims to link-up health care with bioinformatics to build a collaborative research platform that enables a more effective biomedical research. In that, it addresses various barriers and issues, including privacy both by policy and by technical means, towards establishing its eventual system. It makes extensive use of language technology for information extraction and presentation, and its shared repository is based around coherent “chronicles” of patients’ histories that go beyond traditional health record structure. It makes use of a collaborative research workbench that encompasses several technologies and uses many tools providing a rich platform for clinical researcher.

**Keywords:** cancer, computerized patient records, natural language processing, bioinformatics, privacy, confidentiality, security, electronic health records

**Category:** K6.5, J.3, I.2.7, I.5.0, I.7.0, H.3.1, H.3.3, H.3.4, H.3.5, H.5.2, K.4.1

### **1 Introduction**

Our rapidly increasing ability to gather information at the molecular level has not been matched by improvements in our ability to gather information at the patient level. There is a strong convergence of need between current trends towards safer more evidence based patient care (*e.g.* [Kohn 2000]) and current trends in post-genomic research<sup>1</sup> which seek to link molecular level processes to the progress of disease and the outcome of treatment . Both need to be able to answer the questions: *What happened and why? What was done and why.* Simple though these questions may

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<sup>1</sup> research on genomics – the study of genes and their functions- for translating the outcomes of the humane genome project into medical discoveries.

seem, they remain difficult to answer without recourse to manual examination of patients' notes – a time consuming process whether the notes are electronic or paper. Yet without answers to these questions, it is difficult either to measure the quality of care or to investigate the factors affecting onset and recurrence of disease.

The Clinical E-Sciences Framework (CLEF) project seeks to address key barriers to answering those questions. Its prime objective is to produce an end-to-end cycle that both improves information for patient care and results in a growing repository of pseudonymised patient data linked to genetic and genomic information that can be safely shared for biomedical research. The emerging design presents a vision of effective safe information management serving both patient care and biomedical research.

However there are various barriers and issues that need to be removed or addressed before this can be accomplished. We categorise the key barriers and/or requirements as follows:

- *Privacy, consent, and security* – at all levels: policy, organisational structure, and technical implementation.
- *Information capture* – information extracted from text as well as collected from structured records, reports, and results.
- *Information integration and 'chronicalisation'* – to infer from a coherent history of events from the hundreds of diverse documents that make up the raw material of the patient record.
- *Information querying, analysis, presentation and summarisation* – to make the information easily accessible to both practising clinicians and biomedical researchers with minimal specialist training.
- *Knowledge resources* – to recognise the significance and interrelationships of events.
- *Standards for both data and metadata* – to permit effective information sharing and re-use.

Initially, the project focuses on cancer as a pilot area, however it aims to provide a model that might be used in many disciplines. Cancer has the obvious advantages of immediate links to post-genomic research and overall importance in the strategy of the NHS and most other health systems. However, there are two less obvious features of cancer that make it a useful test case for prototype systems.

- Cancer patients are seen repeatedly and their records summarised repeatedly, thereby giving rise to texts' repetition that enhances the results of information extraction.
- Cancer follows a relatively stereotyped course with clear index events: diagnosis, recurrence, death etc, which make alignment of patient histories relatively straightforward.

Various methods and technologies are used in the project to address these barriers, issues or requirements. The rest of the paper attempts to describe these methods and technologies in more details.

## 2 Information flow

The requirements and technologies are best understood in the context of the information flow that has emerged from the design process and is shown in Figure 1.

Starting with the “Patient care and dictated text” at the top of the diagram, the flow is:

- *Capture* of the information. Some information comes from dictated and transcribed text. Other information comes directly from hospital information systems – e.g. laboratory results, prescriptions, etc. Initially the project focuses data drawn from one or two hospitals to limit complexities of required ethical approvals and diversities across medical record systems and rather enabling a potentially better focus on the concepts of the chosen pilot area.
- *Pseudonymisation* of all information at the originating hospital by removal of overt identifying items – name, date of birth, etc - and by providing a CLEF entry identifier that can only be reversed by the provider (or their nominated trusted third party) .
- *Depersonalisation* of the texts to remove any residual information that might risk identification – e.g. names of relatives, nick names, place names, unusual occupations, etc. Hence a requirement for reliable scalable techniques that are efficient, have high precision and able to handle different types of (input) data or text formats.
- *Information extraction* of key information from the texts into predefined “templates”, possibly with the help of the context provided by the information already in the repository hence the requirement for the next point.
- *Integration into the health record repository* of all information including laboratories, radiology, and genomic analyses.
- *Constructing the chronicle* to infer a coherent view of the patient’s history. Typically the same information occurs in many different documents with different levels of granularity, clarity and sometimes conflicts that must be reconciled.




Figure 1: Basic CLEF Information Flow

From this point the information can go in two directions.

- *For patient care* - back to the clinicians in the form of summaries and reports for patient care which can be re-identified by the hospital, providing a concise up-to-date summary of a patients' condition drawn from the provided patient information. This is a prime request of clinicians for improving patient care, for instance. Because it requires re-identification of patients, this step can only occur at the hospital and after security controls have been stringently tested and agreed to be adequate. The project currently focuses on clinical data drawn from the Royal Marsden Hospital (RMH) to develop its initial theory, technologies and tools. Scaling up and generalising the project developed technologies to other hospitals, and domains is a next phase of the project.
- *For clinical research* - on to the repository to be queried by researchers using the collaborative research workbench.

Another potential direction for the information flow is that the information can be further enriched by the results of researchers' queries, their workflows, interpretations,

curation and links to external information and thus becomes the basis for virtual communities of researchers.

### 3 Methods and Technologies

The focus is on the specific technologies which are currently barriers to obtaining and integrating clinical information. The following describes the used methods and technologies to overcome the obstacles outlined above. It relates to each of the respective parts of the information flow diagram shown in Figure 1, except that of the privacy and confidentiality where it was set as a policy framework in the project that took a significant amount of effort and time to complete the process, which as a repercussion caused delays in the initial stages of the project.

#### 3.1 Security, privacy, confidentiality, and consent

As it is clear from the “stop signs” in Figure 1, much of the infrastructure involves privacy and security. The overarching requirement is a policy and oversight framework for privacy and consent. No technical solution can be perfect, so confidence in the organizational measures is the most critical single criterion for success.

Furthermore, no technical solution can succeed without vigilance. A key part of the policy is the obligation of care for all researchers to report potential hazards to privacy as part of the routine use of the repository coupled with technical measures to make it easy to do so.

However, technical measures are required and the requirements potentially conflict. Pseudonymous identifiers must be secure but must also support a) linking from multiple sources, b) re-identification with consent by the healthcare provider c) withdrawal or modification of consent by the patient. Both initial pseudonymisation and re-identification must be done solely within the hospital providing the information. Therefore, two stages of pseudonymisation are at least envisaged: one for entry from the hospital level, a second for linkage and use within the repository itself. Combinations of trusted third parties and techniques from e-commerce (*e.g.* [Zhang 2000]) are being investigated. The project will eventually modify or develop its own algorithms suitable to the structure of the input data. Currently, to facilitate a fast transfer of raw data to the rest of the project, a non-sophisticated algorithm is used to pseudonymise the data at the hospital or data source. It removes mainly the patient identifying fields from patients’ records. This has been developed by the hospital to “fit” with the structure of its data and the deployed electronic record system.

The use of text extraction requires that special attention be paid to removing identifiers from text using language technology – a process we term “depersonalisation” which uses well established techniques from “named entity extraction” [Gaizauskas 2003b] and related techniques [Taira 2002]. At the first stage, the corpus of records from deceased patients is used to check the effectiveness of the depersonalisation mechanisms, as a condition before using the records of live patients. A preliminary progress has been in the project towards this goal, however several

formative implementations and evaluations of the natural language based technique are yet to be done. [Gaizauskas 2003b] provides further details.

The other side of the issue is the employment of *statistical disclosure control* technology (as a privacy enhancing technique) [Elliot 2002] to monitor and blur the output of queries to reduce the risk of deliberate or accidental re-identification through queries of the pseudonymised repository. No matter how well pseudonymised, de-identified and depersonalised, there is always a risk that personal data can be re-identified through sophisticated cross referencing, statistical or data mining techniques. This risk of such re-identification is well established and techniques to combat it are developing rapidly [Elliot 2002, Lin 2002, Murphy 2002, Sweeney 2002]. This technology focuses heavily on the assessment of risk in single, static and cross-sectional datasets [Cox 2001, Domingo-Ferrer 2001]. A systematic risk assessment disclosure control methodology [Cox 2001] for the additional risks posed by *multiple* table releases will be employed to further to reduce the risk of re-identification.

Privacy is relative to risk and consent. All records in the repository contain detailed metadata on the level of consent granted for their use by patients. In fact, the project is significantly contributing to the existing efforts on creating agreed standards for metadata on consent within the community. See [Kalra 2003] a more detailed description of the privacy, confidentiality and security framework.

### 3.2 Information Extraction & Language Technology

Doctors dictate. Much of the key information in clinical records continues, and will continue for the foreseeable future, to be contained in unstructured or at best minimally structured texts. Hence a major part of CLEF is devoted to adapting and evaluating mechanisms for information extraction from text [Gaizauskas 1996, Friedman 2002]. Four features of the cancer domain make information extraction feasible:

- a) the very limited sublanguage, even more so than for medicine as a whole [Friedman 2002];
- b) much of the specialised information is in common with molecular biology which is a major target for current text extraction efforts *e.g.* [Swanson 1997, Gaizauskas 2003b];
- c) the well defined list of index events and signs that allows the template for extraction to be well defined;
- d) the existence of multiple reports for most events.

The existence of multiple reports is particularly important and has not been widely noted elsewhere to the best of our knowledge. Cancer patients are seen over a long period of time and their records summarized repeatedly so that there are many parallel or near parallel texts – often 150 or more text documents per patient. What may be unclear or ambiguous in one text can be refined from others. This is particularly important when dealing with records from a referral hospital where the system will usually start in the “middle of the story”. For example, first document might simply mention breast cancer in the past, concentrating on the current recurrence. A summary, later, might give a date for a mastectomy but no details of the tumour type. Eventually, perhaps after information from the referring hospital was received, a

definitive statement of the time, tumour, spread, and treatment might be found. A more detailed description of the information extraction process can be found in [Gaizauskas 2003a].

### 3.3 “Chronicalisation”, Repository and Integration

At the heart of architecture is the central EHR repository and “chronicle”. The need for creating the “chronicle” came out of the classic problem of electronic health records, i.e. to maintain a faithful, secure, non-repudiatable record of what healthcare workers have heard, seen thought and done [Rector 1995]. The EHR repository follows standards designed to achieve these aims – e.g. OpenEHR [Ingram 1995], CEN standard 13606 [CEN/TC 2003], and associated development of “archetypes” [Beale 2002]. However, the central issue for this research is different – to infer a single coherent view of each patients’ history from the myriad documents and data in the EHR and to align them with other similar patients in aggregates for querying and research.

Furthermore, our interest is not only in the literal information in the documents but in their clinical significance – not only what was done but *why*. It is not enough to know that the report of a bone scan claimed “only osteoporotic changes”. It is necessary to recognise that this indicates that there are “no bony metastases found”. It is not enough to know that the patient was taken off chemotherapy, it is important to know what side effect or concurrent illness intervened.

The compilation of a single coherent “chronicle” for each patient from distributed heterogeneous information that makes up the medical record is a major task. At one level, the chronicle provides a clear presentation to clinicians and researchers of the course of one patient’s illness as shown in Figure 2. At another they are data structures which can be easily aligned on “index events” – diagnosis, first treatment, relapse, etc.- and aggregated for statistical analysis to answer questions such as “Of patients with breast cancer with a particular genetic profile, what is the comparison of the time to first recurrence for those treated with Tamoxifen as against those treated with a new proposed drug regimen”. “How many dropped out of each treatment and why?” “How many required supplementary therapy for the side effects of treatment and why?”

Assembling the chronicle is therefore a knowledge intensive task that relies on inferences. The reliability of these inferences may vary, and it is essential to record not only the inferences but also the evidence on which they were based and their reliability. A graphical presentation of a chronicle developed manually as part of the requirements exercise is shown in Figure 2. A human observer can quickly infer many of the reasons from the juxtaposition of events; an effective computer based “chronicle” must capture those inferences.

The “chronicalisation” process employs several algorithms to draw different types of information or data and assemble its overall content into individual patient chronicle structures. Drawing up chronicle temporal information is one of the initial indexing algorithms, for example, which has partially been completed. The description of this algorithm is beyond the scope of this paper, please refer to [Harkema 2005] for further details.




Figure 2: An individual patient chronicle in graphical form

### 3.4 Collaborative Workbench

For the data in the repository to be useful, it must be easily accessible to scientists and clinicians. A common workbench (see Figure 3) is employed that acts as the outer layer, interface and/or window that enables end users and researchers to access, analyse and examine the underlying information. The workbench hides the complexities of the underlying technologies such as information extraction, repository etc. while providing the necessary mechanism to enable easy use of the technologies and information. It provides a coherent platform, with one “feel and look”, allowing tools developed within the project or if appropriate in other projects to be plugged within the platform. The workbench is built around several open source technologies while allowing remote secure access to the CLEF authorised users. An application web server, such as Apache Jakarta Tomcat [Apache 2005], is used for delivering web content, on top of which a portlet container, such as Gridsphere [Novoty 2004], is used to unify the interface and presentation layer of the workbench.



Figure 3: CLEF Workbench Main Portal web Interface

Several special technologies have been developed within the workbench including security, auditing, and logging, and tools for query formulation and visualisation and results presentation and summarisation. In addition, it includes tools that link to external available resources and relevant literature. The security components are built on technologies developed by other projects, such as Shibboleth and PERMIS [Chadwick 2003] for authentication and authorisation mechanisms, and use PKI infrastructure for secure encrypted transmission of data.




Figure 4: CLEF workbench overall architecture

The general CLEF architecture for the workbench framework is shown in (the overall diagram) Figure 4. In addition to others It highlights some of the (sub)

components or services that the workbench framework includes and/or provides. These briefly include: user and session management services, portal services, tools and users administration services, authentication and authorisation services, query formulation and visualization services, auditing and logging services, and relevant 3rd party services. Also other services such as hazard monitoring, statistical analysis are planned to be implemented or integrated at later stages.




Figure 5: CLEF workbench (portal) architecture

### 3.4.1 The workbench architecture

Figure 5 presents the CLEF workbench portal architecture. CLEF workbench consists of two main parts: the CLEF portal and the portlet container. The CLEF portal itself is made up of a collection of interface and service portlets classified, combined and structured to provide the main CLEF functions. The portlet container holds these portlets and other services, and is the main used underlying framework for integrating various CLEF (and 3rd party) components. The content delivery is done by the servlet-container Apache JakartaTomcat. The (end) user interface is provided by a single or combination of portlets, depending on the respective service or functionality. One of the main advantages of portlets is that they are able to handle rich visual interface controls, including direct mark up fragments, or those generated by a Java scripting language (JSP). The underlying business logic is either implemented as

service portlets (or servlets) within the workbench layer or aided by service portlets that communicate content from external services. Although there are limitations on the level of sophistication of user interfaces, especially graphical user interfaces, the workbench architecture has the flexibility of implementing the underlying business logic in various J2EE compliant technologies including EJB, or can potentially utilise WSRP to incorporate remote content and/or services.

The workbench includes a service communication interface (or API) that communicates with external CLEF (local or remote) components, such as the knowledge base or the Information extraction components. It supports various communication mechanisms, including RMI and WSRP to support legacy components and web services respectively. The workbench framework is extensible to incorporate other 3rd party components, such as prolog, or database engines. The following sections describe the CLEF workbench services and components in more details.

### 3.4.2 The workbench structure and content

The structure and the content are combined together to provide a coherent CLEF portal with one “feel and look” (see Figure 3). Because of the medical data sensitivity and CLEF security constraints, the content in the portal has been classified in three different general categories:

- *Public-type content*: at the top level, the portal includes information accessible by CLEF portal visitors, with minimal security constraints. Information related to the domain knowledge, the project end-user services, ethical and confidentiality framework are included at this level. Also general CLEF services, such as request user registration, request general support or information, are available as part of this category. Other CLEF unique general output information, or related news or events are also included under this category.
- *CLEF-general-registered-users type content*: this type of content is only accessible by authenticated registered users. CLEF users related information, general guidelines, CLEF related events, news, standards etc, are available at this level. Also, user and portal related services, (e.g. user preferences customisation), CLEF general services (e.g. request upgrade of user access level, search services, related external resources etc) are included under this category.
- *CLEF-special-content*: access to clinical information through query formulation/submission is available under this category. Access to this type of category (content and services) requires ethical approval, by CLEF’s ethical approval committee. There are many special sub-services available under this category, e.g. per projects, teams, organisations and/or individual cases. However, content and/or sub-services under this category is being further refined by the CLEF ethical and confidentiality team as the project develops depending on users requirements and types of access. Also the CLEF ethical and confidentiality team continually assesses and/or categories each newly developed portal service, based on the content it accesses or provides.

The overall layout/structure of the CLEF portal has been designed based on these categories. These categories also defined the layout of each sub-part of the CLEF portal. Some areas of the portal are constraint by the provided end-user configurable layout or interface. Also content and services are sequenced (or put in workflows) differently and put in an optimal user interfaces and layout to achieve or perform a particular operation or unit-of-work, for different types of users (e.g. specialist clinical researchers, general users) depending on their privileges and type of function.

### 3.4.3 The workbench user and session management services

Another important feature of the workbench is that it has the capability to manage CLEF users. In addition to collecting demographic information, and establishing roles or privileges, which are then mainly used to authenticate users and set their authorisation levels, users must go through a registration and approval process before they are given access.

Researchers must be accredited by the Ethical Oversight Committee to gain access through the workbench to anything except pre-computed results and metadata. Despite other precautions, it is assumed that if individual records can be read in detail, there is the risk of identification. Therefore, all information is treated with as if it were identifiable[Kalra 2003]. Most researchers will be accredited only for performing queries that generate aggregated results controlled through the disclosure control technologies. Special permission of the Ethical Oversight Committee is required to gain access to individual patient records even though they are pseudonymised.

The user management in CLEF is not limited to the workbench, but also the whole system including the underlying data sources and services. Handling multi-user sessions simultaneously while keeping session instances separate across services and portlets is critical for the workbench. This is handled by the session manager. The following functions or services are provided by the user and session managers:

- *User registration*: this service allows new users to request to become CLEF registered users or existing users to upgrade their registration levels where appropriate.
- *User types, roles and privileges*: this service allows creating and setting different types of users (clinical research, clinicians, bioinformatician etc), allocated different access levels or roles with different access privileges.
- *User workspace and preferences*: this service allows creating individual and team workspaces for registered users. Also it allows users to set their own preferences or customise their workspace to include different preferred services, tools or content.
- *Team, project, organisation management*: this service allows managing a group of users as one unit, with common or separate workspaces that allow bringing together relevant services, tools and content. In some cases, the team leader might be given privileges to manage his/her own team, especially if it is part of an organisation or research institute with more than one team. This feature is important for cumulative submitted queries and previous queries

submitted by all team members to enable effective functioning of the statistical disclosure component (SDC) to determine subsequent queries output.

- *User environment*: this service allows users to customise their environment to select for example different colours, schemes or organisation or layout of interface portlets.
- *Session control attributes*: this service controls session attributes, such as timeout of sessions with relation to user login and logout services, while keeping separate multi-user instances.
- *Session log*: logging user interactions with the workbench, such as services invoked, type of information viewed and so forth. Logging patterns of work adds more control, enhance the interface and help the support team to track and trace problems, for user support teams.

#### **3.4.4 The workbench query formulation and visualisation tools**

The other important part of the workbench is the query formulation and visualisation tools. We are experimenting with a variety of textual and graphical query and visualisation interfaces to the repository. However, the prime interface for researchers is being designed around techniques from language generation known as WYSIWYM –“What you see is what you meant”[Power 1998, Bouayad-Agha 2000]. An example is given in Figure 6.

The WYSIWYM interface allows users to expand a natural language like query progressively to produce queries of arbitrary complexity and then summarises the results, again in generated natural language. These interfaces are provided in different portlets and accessible by users depending on their access control privileges. They provide several types of queries and different ways of displaying results, e.g. graphical, textual, tabular etc.

#### **3.4.5 The workbench Security and access control**

The security components of the workbench, i.e. authentication and authorisation are part of the overall CLEF security system. The authentication service enables registered to login in the workbench to access common general-user type information and services. The authorisation service determines access rights and privileges in terms of allowed services and related content. Users privileges are set and determined by the user registration and approval process including the intended purpose of using CLEF by the user. The description of CLEF security, ethical and confidential framework is beyond the scope of this paper. See [Kalra 2003] for further details.

As mentioned above, CLEF security approach is built on technologies based on Shibboleth, FAME and PERMIS technologies. The workbench authentication is provided through Shibboleth and FAME with a single sign on (SSO) service integrated with the portal user interface. Authorisation is a role-based access control provided by PERMIS and governed by CLEF security policy. Their functionality and approach are described in more details in [Chadwick 2003].





Figure 6: Example of WYSIWYM query formulation and result visualisation

### 3.4.6 The workbench information auditing/logging services

Another functionality of the workbench is storing information about various functional and user aspects, such as those related to user submitted queries, accessed information and services. Some of the stored information can be used by the SDC component, for instance to determine the output results of some of the submitted queries. The workbench information auditing component is linked to the data sources (knowledge base) information auditing components and the overall system provenance type information component. It audits/logs these three types of information, although the

implementation is incrementally expanding to include finer details and potentially others.

- *Invoked services, content and support questions*: it stores information about the viewed information and invoked services. This type of information is useful, not just for the session manager mentioned above, but also on a longer term for improving the structure/layout of the workbench, studying users patterns of work and overall security system enhancements.
- *Submitted queries and analysed data*: this is mainly collected for the SDC component which requires access to previously submitted queries to determine the appropriate output/decision. This information is collected by both auditing services within the workbench and the knowledge base.
- *Provenance-type information*: This is collected in varying degrees, however because CLEF and also the workbench consist of many services, and portlets (which some are an aggregation of more than one service), provenance information is useful for debugging technical and analytical aspects of the system and workflows in the system.

### 3.5 Knowledge resources required

All the key technologies in CLEF are knowledge intensive. The overall approach is based on “ontology anchored knowledge bases” – knowledge bases anchored in common conceptual models but conveying additional domain knowledge about the concepts represented. Examples include which drugs are used for which purposes, the significance of different results from different studies, the fact that a seemingly positive finding such as “evidence only of degenerative changes” may in practice convey the negative information that “no metastases were found”. Some of this information exists in established resources such as the UMLS [UMLS 2004]. However, most of it needs to be compiled.

The repository is intended to be more than simply a data collection. Rather it is intended, in the spirit of “collections based research and e-Science” to be a repository of both data and what the interpretations of that data by various researchers, their conclusions, and the methods they have used to achieve them. In this, it requires intensive metadata of at least five types:

- *Resource discovery information*: what is in the repository and what services does it provide.
- *Provenance information*: where information came from, the evidence for any inferences, and the uncertainty of the information.
- *Usage and workflow information*: how the information has been used, including information allowing monitoring potential compromises of privacy.
- *Consent and sensitivity information* about what information may be included in queries for different purposes.
- *Clinical significance and consequences*: why things were done and what they are believed to mean, always annotated by provenance metadata.

The first three are shared much in common with clinical trials, and some of the metadata schemas must take into account the emerging standards for clinical trial metadata [CDISC 2004]. The fourth and fifth types of metadata are more specific to the biomedical and health care focus.

## 4 Discussion and Conclusion

The convergence of need between post-genomic research and improved clinical care presents a unique opportunity; realising that opportunity suggests a radical restructuring of information flow and integration. The demand for large shared repositories of clinical and genomic information data is now clear. In the UK there are at least three other major initiatives: BioBank, the National Cancer Research Institutes/Department of Health National Translational Cancer Network, and the National Cancer Research Network [Biobank 2004].

Paradoxically, the genomic information is easy to capture. Although there will be increasing amounts of structured clinical data, experience suggests that much clinical information will continue to be dictated. Currently, this information can only be captured by labour intensive use of “data managers”. Scaling this effort up manually is too resource intensive to be plausible. Fortunately, the many parallel texts and stereotyped course of cancer make it a particularly good area for information extraction.

The sheer size, complexity, and repetition in cancer records make direct use of traditional electronic health records problematic and inefficient. Thus a coherent “chronicle” of patient histories is placed at the centre of the repository. The notion of “chronicle” owes much to ideas of “abstraction” developed in connection with guideline research [Rector 2001, Shahar 1997] and the notion of a “virtual patient record” in the HL7. The clear focus of the approach on “*What was done and why?*”, “*What happened and why?*” should contribute to these broader efforts as well as to its prime goal - to use clinical information intelligently and effectively for both patient care and post-genomic research.

CLEF, through its workbench, developed technologies and underlying services, provides a coherent collaborative research environment that enables clinical and other researchers to safely and securely analyse, examine and query the underlying pseudonymised clinical information, drawn from operational electronic health records. The operational CLEF collaborative research system provides the infrastructure and tools and can be used by both, world wide by, remote authorised users and can be deployed in hospitals and used by in house clinicians to aid patient health care.

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