

## **Software/Hardware Co-Design of Efficient and Secure Cryptographic Hardware**

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**Abstract:** Most cryptographic systems are based on the modular exponentiation to perform the non-linear scrambling operation of data. It is performed using successive modular multiplications, which are time consuming for large operands. Accelerating cryptography needs optimising the time consumed by a single modular multiplication and/or reducing the total number of modular multiplications performed. Using a genetic algorithm, we first yield the minimal sequence of powers, generally called addition chain, that need to be computed to finally obtain the modular exponentiation result. Then, we exploit the co-design methodology to engineer a cryptographic device that accelerates the encryption/decryption throughput without requiring considerable hardware area. Moreover, the obtained designed cryptographic hardware is completely secure against known attacks.

**Keywords:** Evolutionary Computation, Co-Design, Genetic Algorithm, Cryptography, Addition-Chain

**Categories:** H.3.1, H.3.2, H.3.3, H.3.7, H.5.1

### **1 Introduction**

The modular exponentiation is a common operation for scrambling and is used by several public-key cryptosystems, such as the RSA encryption scheme [Rivest, 78]. It consists of a repetition of modular multiplications:  $C = T^E \bmod M$ , where  $T$  is the plain text such that  $0 \leq T < M$  and  $C$  is the cipher text or vice-versa,  $E$  is either the public or the private key depending on whether  $T$  is the plain or the cipher text, and  $M$  is called the modulus. The decryption and encryption operations are performed using the same procedure, i.e. using the modular exponentiation.

The performance of such cryptosystems is primarily determined by the implementation efficiency of the modular multiplication and exponentiation. As the operands, i.e. the plain text of a message or the ciphertext (possibly a partially ciphered) are usually large (i.e. 1024 bits or more), and in order to improve time

requirements of the encryption/decryption operations, it is essential to attempt to minimise the number of modular multiplications performed as well as the time needed to perform a single modular multiplication.

Most of the work [Blum, 99, Walter, 93, Nedjah, 02a] on improving the characteristics, i.e. encryption/decryption throughput and required resources, focus on one aspect: minimising the exponentiation time by implementing the operation on hardware. However, the proposed solutions require considerable amount of hardware area. In this paper, we propose and implement a novel solution that minimises the number of required modular multiplications along with the modular multiplication time without too much increase in resource requirements. We do so using genetic algorithms [Nedjah, 02b] and the co-design methodology [Balarin, 97]. The proposed solution finds a balance between the two requirements: time and area. Also, it allows one to change the encryption and decryption key freely without any extra cost.

First, we introduce the concept of evolutionary addition chains as well as addition chain based methods to perform modular exponentiation. Then, we introduce Montgomery's Algorithm used to implement the modular multiplication. Thereafter, we describe the co-design system. Consequently, we discuss the architecture used to implement the mixed solution. Finally, we draw some conclusions based on the analysis of the system developed.

## 2 Addition Chains

It is clear that one should not compute  $T^E$  then reduce the result modulo  $M$  as the space requirements to store  $T^E$  is  $E \times \log_2 M$ , which is huge. A simple procedure to compute  $C = T^E \bmod M$  is based on the paper-and-pencil method. This method requires  $E-1$  modular multiplications computing all powers of  $T$ :  $T \rightarrow T^2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow T^{E-1} \rightarrow T^E$ . The paper-and-pencil method computes more multiplications than necessary. For instance, to compute  $T^8$ , it needs 7 multiplications, i.e.  $T \rightarrow T^2 \rightarrow T^3 \rightarrow T^4 \rightarrow T^5 \rightarrow T^6 \rightarrow T^7 \rightarrow T^8$ . However,  $T^8$  can be computed using only 3 multiplications  $T \rightarrow T^2 \rightarrow T^4 \rightarrow T^8$ . The basic question is: what is the fewest number of multiplications to compute  $T^E$ , given that the only operation allowed is multiplying two already computed powers of  $T$ ? Answering the above question is *NP*-hard, but there are several efficient algorithms that can find a near optimal one.

The addition chain based methods attempt to find a chain of numbers such that the first number of the chain is 1 and the last is the exponent  $E$ , and in which each member of the chain is the sum of two previous members. For instance, the longest addition chain is  $[1, 2, 3, \dots, E-2, E-1, E]$ . An *addition chain* of length  $l$  for an integer  $n$  is a sequence of integers  $[a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_l]$  such that  $a_0 = 1$ ,  $a_l = n$  and  $a_k = a_i + a_j$ ,  $0 \leq i < j < k \leq l$ . The algorithm used to compute the modular exponentiation  $C = T^E \bmod M$ , is specified by Algorithm 1.

Computing the minimal addition chain for a given exponent is a hard problem [Nedjah, 02b, DeJong, 89]. We used genetic algorithms [Haupt, 98] to yield optimal addition chains for large exponents [Nedjah, 02b]. We showed that the addition chains obtained using the evolutionary methodology are always very much better than those used by the traditional exponentiation methods such as the  $m$ -ary methods and sliding window methods [Nedjah, 02c]. Note that for a given exponent, there exist many

addition chains. As the minimal addition chains are numerically unpredictable, every computation based on it is also unpredictable and consequently the cryptographic hardware that uses this addition chain to encrypt data is completely secure.

**Algorithm 1.** AdditionChainBasedMethod(T, M, E)

```

0: let [a0=1 a1 a2 ... al=E] be an addition chain for E;
1: powers[0] = T;
2: for k := 1 to l
3:   let ak = ai + aj | 1 ≤ i < k and 1 ≤ j < k;
4:   powers[k] := powers[i] × powers[j] mod M;
5: return powers[l];
End.

```

### 3 Montgomery's Algorithm

One of the widely used algorithms for efficient modular multiplication is Montgomery's algorithm [Montgomery, 85]. This algorithm computes the product of two integers modulo a third one without performing division by  $M$ . It yields the reduced product using a series of additions.

Let  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $M$  be the multiplicand, the multiplier and the modulus respectively and let  $n$  be the number of digits in their binary representation, i.e. the radix is 2. So, we denote  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $M$  as follows:

$$A = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i \times 2^i, \quad B = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} b_i \times 2^i \quad \text{and} \quad M = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} m_i \times 2^i$$

The pre-conditions of the Montgomery algorithm are as follows:

- The modulus  $M$  needs to be relatively prime to the *radix*, i.e. there exists no common divisor for  $M$  and the radix;
- The multiplicand and the multiplier need to be smaller than  $M$ .

As we use the binary representation of the operands, then the modulus  $M$  needs to be odd to satisfy the first pre-condition.

Montgomery's algorithm uses the least significant digit of the accumulating *modular partial product* to determine the multiple of  $M$  to subtract. The usual multiplication order is reversed by choosing multiplier digits from least to most significant and shifting down. If  $R$  is the current modular partial product, then  $q$  is chosen so that  $R + q \times M$  is a multiple of the radix  $r$ , and this is right-shifted by  $r$  positions, i.e. divided by  $r$  for use in the next iteration. So, after  $n$  iterations, the result obtained is  $R = A \times B \times r^n \bmod M$ . A modified version of the Montgomery's algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.

In order to yield the right result, we need an extra Montgomery modular multiplication by the constant  $2^{2n} \bmod M$ . However, as the main objective of the use

of Montgomery modular multiplication algorithm is to compute exponentiations, it is preferable to Montgomery pre-multiply the operands by  $2^{2^n}$  and Montgomery post-multiply the result by 1 to get rid of the  $2^n$  factor. Now, we concentrate on describing the implementation of the Montgomery multiplication algorithm.

**Algorithm 2.** *MontgomeryAlgorithm*(A, B, M)

```

0: int R := 0;
1: for i := 0 to n-1
2:   R := R + ai × B;
3:   if r0 = 0 then R := R div 2
4:   else R := (R + M) div 2;
5: return R;
End.

```

## 4 The Co-design Architecture

Our investigation is based on Algorithm 1, assuming that the addition chain is provided. The software approach consists of implementing the algorithm in a programming language, such as C, and executing the compiled code in a general-purpose computer.

The bottleneck in the software approach is the evaluation of the modular multiplication. Therefore, we decided to move this computation to hardware in order to explore the speedup that can be achieved by a hardware implementation. From this point on, we will have a mixed implementation, in which part of the initial specification is in software and another part is in hardware. Consequently, we will have to deal with the interaction between these two subsystems. The dynamics within the co-encryption/decryption system is described in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Dynamics within the mixed encryption/decryption process

The execution cycle within the co-design system is described in the following seven steps:

1. The genetic algorithm evolves a minimal addition chain for the given encryption/decryption key;
2. The evolutionary addition chain is stored into the co-system shared memory;
3. The software subsystem executes a program that implements the computation of Algorithm 1 and is stored in the shared memory;
4. The software subsystem finds the operands of the modular multiplication the hardware subsystem has to perform;
5. The software subsystem notifies the hardware subsystem to start the modular multiplication and waits;
6. Once the modular product is reached, the hardware subsystem notifies the software subsystem and halts;
7. The software subsystem checks whether the last multiplication was performed; if yes, it reads the shared memory to acquire the result of the modular exponentiation, otherwise it performs step 4 repeatedly.

In the following sections, we explain, in details, the architecture of each of the subsystems.

#### 4.1 The Genetic Algorithm

Genetic algorithms [Haupt, 98] maintain a *population of individuals* that evolve according to *selection* rules and other *genetic operators*, such as *mutation* and *recombination*. Each individual receives a measure of *fitness*. *Selection* focuses on high fitness individuals. Mutation and recombination provide general heuristics that simulate the reproduction or *crossover* process. Those operators attempt to perturb the characteristics of the parent individuals as to generate *distinct* offspring individuals.

The addition chain minimisation problem consists of finding a sequence of numbers that constitutes an addition chain for a given exponent. The sequence of numbers should be of a minimal length. This problem is *NP*-complete, that is why genetic algorithms are perfect to minimal addition chains.

Encoding of individuals is one of the implementation decisions one has to take in order to use genetic algorithms. It very depends on the nature of the problem to solve. There are several representations that have been used with success: *binary encoding*, which is the most common mainly because it was used in the first works on genetic algorithms, represents an individual as a string of bits; *permutation encoding*, mainly used in ordering problem, encodes an individual as a sequence of integers; *value encoding* represents an individual as a sequence of values that consist of an evaluation of some aspect of the problem [DeJong, 89, Haupt, 98].

In our implementation, an individual represents an evolutionary addition chain. We use the binary encoding wherein 1 implies that the entry number is a member of the addition chain and 0 otherwise. Let  $n = 9$  be the exponent. The encoding of Figure 2 represents the addition chain [1, 2, 4, 5, 9]:

<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1

Figure 2: Addition chain encoding

## 4.2 Software Subsystem Architecture

In Algorithm 2, the formal parameters can be of 1024 bits. Therefore, instead of passing these values, we decided to pass the indexes to the array *powers* (*i*, *j* and *k*), together with the address of *M* and that of *powers*. Parameter *size* is related to the size of the operands. Algorithm 3 below shows the modified version of Algorithm 1.

**Algorithm 3.** *ModAdditionChainBasedMethod*(*T*, *M*, *E*)  
**0:** let [*a*<sub>0</sub>=1, *a*<sub>1</sub>, *a*<sub>2</sub>, ..., *a*<sub>l</sub>=*E*] be an addition chain for *E*;  
**1:** powers[0] := *T*;  
**2:** for *k* := 1 to *l*  
**3:** find *k* | *i*<*k* and *j*<*k*, *a*<sub>*k*</sub> = *a*<sub>*i*</sub> + *a*<sub>*j*</sub>;  
**4:** ModifiedMontgomery(*i*, *j*, *k*, *M*, powers, *size*);  
**5:** return powers[*l*];  
**End.**

In order to perform the chosen computation, the hardware subsystem needs the function's parameters, which are sent by the software subsystem. Integer and pointer parameters are passed via memory-mapped registers, while data arrays are stored in the shared memory. Algorithm 2 must be modified as well, so as to include the necessary hardware interaction, which can be seen in Algorithm 4 below.

**Algorithm 4.** *ModifiedMontgomery*(*i*, *j*, *k*, &*M*, &powers, *size*)  
**0:** char\* const parameter<sub>0</sub> := (char\*) 0xF000;  
**1:** char\* const parameter<sub>1</sub> := (char\*) 0xE000;  
**2:** char\* const parameter<sub>2</sub> := (char\*) 0xD000;  
**3:** char\*\* const parameter<sub>3</sub> := (char\*\*) 0xC000;  
**4:** char\*\* const parameter<sub>4</sub> := (char\*\*) 0xB000;  
**5:** \*parameter<sub>0</sub> := *i*; \*parameter<sub>1</sub> := *j*;  
**6:** \*parameter<sub>2</sub> := *k*;  
**7:** if *k* = 1 then  
**8:** \*parameter<sub>3</sub> := &*M*;  
**9:** \*parameter<sub>4</sub> := &powers;  
**10:** \*parameter<sub>5</sub> := *size*;  
**11:** start();  
**12:** waitForInterruption();  
**13:** acknowledge();  
**End.**

As can be seen from Algorithm 4, *parameter*<sub>0</sub>, *parameter*<sub>1</sub>, *parameter*<sub>2</sub>, *parameter*<sub>3</sub>, *parameter*<sub>4</sub> and *parameter*<sub>5</sub> contain the addresses of the parameter registers located in the hardware subsystem. After their initialisation, the hardware subsystem can be started to execute the computation. In our case, parameters *i*, *j* and *k* are used to address the elements of the array *powers*, while parameter *powers* holds the address of the first element of the corresponding array. Hence, *i*, *j* and *k* are used as displacement within the array area. Since *M* can be large, we decided to keep *M* in the shared memory and pass its address only. Notice that it is up to the hardware subsystem to get the necessary data from the shared memory, once it is started. The

software subsystem, then, waits for an interrupt from the hardware subsystem, indicating it has completed the operation.

### 4.3 Hardware Subsystem Architecture

The hardware subsystem comprises the hardware function and the interface logic. The latter deals with the communication between the hardware subsystem and the other entities, i.e. software subsystem and the shared memory. The characteristics of the interface depend closely on the implementation platform. Therefore, we will deal with it in the next section.

The hardware function computes the modular product of two given operands using Montgomery's algorithm described in Section 3. Figure 3 shows the architecture of an iterative implementation [Nedjah, 02a] for the Montgomery modular multiplication method [Montgomery, 85]. The values of  $A$  and  $B$  are obtained from the memory, where the array elements are stored, using parameters  $i$  and  $j$ , respectively. These indexes are provided by the software subsystem. The obtained modular product is stored in the same array  $powers$  in entry  $k = i + j$ .




Figure 3: Montgomery multiplication hardware

The first multiplexer of the proposed architecture, i.e. MUX<sub>21</sub>, passes 0 or the content of register  $B$  depending on whether bit  $a_0$  indicates 0 or 1 respectively. The second multiplexer, i.e. MUX<sub>22</sub>, passes 0 or the content of register  $M$  depending on whether bit  $r_0$  indicates 0 or 1 respectively. The first adder, i.e. ADDER<sub>1</sub>, delivers the sum  $R + a_i \times B$  (line 2 of Algorithm 2), and the second adder, i.e. ADDER<sub>2</sub>, yields the sum  $R + M$  (line 4 of the same algorithm). The shift register SHIFT REGISTER<sub>1</sub> provides the bit  $a_i$ . At each iteration  $i$  of the multiplier, this shift register is right-shifted once, so that the least significant bit of SHIFT REGISTER<sub>1</sub> contains  $a_i$ .

The role of the controller consists of loading  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $M$ , synchronising the shifting and loading operations of SHIFTREGISTER<sub>1</sub> and SHIFTREGISTER<sub>2</sub>, and controlling the number of necessary iterations. Furthermore, embedded into the controller hardware, we find the steps for parameter passing as well as the handshake protocol between the hardware and software subsystems. The handshake control register signals the start (*start*) and parameter passing (*parameters*) commands from the software subsystem, and the done (*done*) command from the hardware subsystem.

In order to synchronise the work of the components of the architecture, the controller is implemented as a state machine, which has 10 states defined as follows:

```

S0: Initialise state machine;
S1: If start = 0 then Go to S2 Else Go to S1;
S2: done := 0;
    If start = 1 then Go to S4
    Else If parameters = 0 then Go to S2;
S3: If parameter0 then Load  $i$  into REGISTER1
    Else If parameter1 then Load  $j$  into REGISTER3
    Else If parameter2 then Load  $k$  into REGISTERk
    Else If parameter3 then
        Load  $M$  into REGISTERM
    Else If parameter4 then
        Load  $powers$  into REGISTERP;
    Else If parameter5 then
        Load  $size$  into counter;
    Go to S2;
S4: Load powers[ $i$ ] from memory into SHIFT REGISTER1;
S5: Load powers[ $j$ ] from memory into REGISTER1;
S6: If  $k = 1$  then
    Load  $M$  from memory into REGISTER2;
S7: Decrement counter;
S8: Load partial result into SHIFT REGISTER2;
S9: Enable SHIFT REGISTER2; Enable SHIFT REGISTER1;
    If counter = 0 then Go to S10 Else Go to S7;
S10: Load SHIFT REGISTER2 into memory powers[ $k$ ];
    done := 1; Go to S1

```

Memory read operations (to obtain the values of  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $M$ ) as well as memory write operations (to store the modular products) are embedded in the specification of



the hardware subsystem and performed by the interface logic. The interface between the hardware function and the software subsystem uses a control register *CR* through which a handshake protocol is implemented. When the software subsystem wants to call the hardware function, it asserts the *start* bit of *CR* (line 11 in Algorithm 4). When the hardware function completes the execution, it asserts the *done* bit of *CR*. When the software subsystem acknowledges the end of the hardware function operation (line 13 in Algorithm 4), it withdraws the start command by resetting the *start* bit of *CR*. When the interface logic detects that the *start* bit was reset, it resets the *done* bit, thus completing the handshake.

## 5 Implementation Platform

In order to obtain a final implementation, we need a processor capable of executing the software instructions (software subsystem) and a hardware device capable of executing the chosen computation (hardware subsystem). Our co-design platform consists of the XS40 board, from Xess [Xess, 03], which is based on the Intel 80C31 micro-controller, the Xilinx<sup>TM</sup> XC4010XL FPGA [Intel, 03] and 32KB of SRAM, shared by the hardware and the software subsystems. A simplified version of the co-design architecture is seen in Figure 4 and the XS40 co-design board is shown in Figure 5.




Figure 4: Co-design system architecture

While the hardware subsystem is computing the required modular product (computation of line 4 in Algorithm 3), the micro-controller finds the entries of array *powers* in which operands of the next modular multiplications (computation of line 3 in Algorithm 3) are located. Interleaving the work of the hardware function with that of the micro-controller improves a great deal the overall performance of the encryption/decryption co-design system.




Figure 5: Xess XS40 co-design board

## 6 Timing and Area Characteristics

In this section, we compare the proposed cryptographic hardware, which is a mixed system, i.e. software and hardware, described throughout this paper with the software-only and hardware-only versions. The software-only system is implemented in ASM51 assembly language [Xilinx, 03]. Recall that the software subsystem of the proposed solution is also implemented using ASM51. The two hardware-only systems are implemented into XS4000: the first system is based on the binary exponentiation method and the second on the  $m$ -ary exponentiation method [Mourelle, 04], which is a generalisation of the binary method as instead of considering windows of one bit, the  $m$ -ary method deals with windows of  $m$  bits. Recall that the hardware subsystem of the mixed system is also implemented into the same FPGA family.

The software-only and one of the hardware-only implementations are based on the binary modular exponentiation. The latter implementation was developed by the authors [Nedjah, 02a]. In the following, we briefly describe the binary method and the hardware architecture of the first hardware-only system and, thereafter, we introduce the  $m$ -ary exponentiation method together with the hardware architecture of the second hardware-only implementation. Interested author can find more details about both hardware implementations in [Nedjah, 02a, Nedjah, 03, Mourelle, 04].

### 6.1 Binary exponentiation-based implementation

The binary exponentiation algorithm is given in Algorithm 5, wherein  $k$  is the number of digits in exponent  $E$ ,  $T$  is the text to be encrypted/decrypted and  $M$  as before is the modulus. Exponent  $E$  consists of its binary representation  $\langle e_{k-1}e_{k-2}\dots e_1e_0 \rangle$ . The algorithm output  $C$  is the ciphertext or plaintext depending on whether  $T$  is the plaintext or ciphertext.

**Algorithm 5.** *BinaryExponentiation*( $T, E, M$ )

```

0: int C;
1: if  $e_{k-1} = 1$  then  $R := T$  else  $R := 1$ ;
2: for  $i := k-2$  downto 0
3:    $C := C \times C \bmod M$ ;
4:   if  $e_i = 1$  then  $C := C \times T \bmod M$ ;
5: return C;
End.
```

Hence the addition chain used by the binary method is as follows, wherein identical members must be discarded. For instance, for exponent  $E = 250 = \langle 11111010 \rangle$ , the addition chain will be [1,2,3,6,7,14, 15, 30, 31, 62, 124, 125, 250].

$$[e_{k-1}, 2e_{k-1}, 2e_{k-1} + e_{k-2}, \dots, 2(2(\dots 2(2e_{k-1} + e_{k-2}) + e_{k-3}) + \dots) + e_1 + e_0]$$

The architecture of the hardware [Nedjah, 03] that performs the binary exponentiation is shown in Figure 6. It uses two modular multipliers whose architectures are that shown in Figure 3 and a controller that determines the sequence of events. When the iteration finishes the controller halts and the result is found in register MPRODUCT. The first multiplier, i.e. MULTIPLIER<sub>1</sub>, performs the squaring of line 3 in Algorithm 5 while the second multiplier, i.e. MULTIPLIER<sub>2</sub>, performs the multiplication of line 4 in Algorithm 5, when it is necessary.

### 6.2 $M$ -ary exponentiation-based implementation

Generally speaking, the  $m$ -ary methods for exponentiation [1] may be thought of as a three major steps procedure: (i) partitioning the binary representation of the exponent  $E$  in  $k$ -bit windows; (ii) pre-computing all possible powers in windows one by one; (iii) iterating the squaring of the partial result  $k$  times to shift it over, and then multiplying it by the power in the next window, if the window is different from 0.

In other words, the  $m$ -ary methods scans the digits of  $E$  from the least significant to the most significant digit and groups them into partitions of equal length  $\log_2 m$ , where  $m$  is a power of two. Note that 2-ary method coincides with the binary exponentiation methods described earlier (Algorithm 5).




Figure 6: Details of the architecture of binary exponentiator

In general, the exponent  $E$  is partitioned into  $p$  partitions, each one containing  $l = \log_2 m$  successive digits. If the last partition has less digits than  $\log_2 m$ , then the exponent is expanded to the left with at most  $\log_2 m - 1$  zeros. The  $m$ -ary algorithm is described in Algorithm 6, wherein as before  $M$  and  $E$  represent the modulus and exponent of the cryptosystem,  $T$  and  $C$  stand for the text and the ciphertext, respectively, and, finally,  $V_i$  denotes the decimal value of partition  $P_i$ .

Algorithm 6 implements the modular multiplication based on Montgomery's algorithm (Algorithm 2) and whose hardware architecture is given in Figure 7.

**Algorithm 6.**  $M$ -aryExponentiation( $T, M, E$ )

```

1: Partition  $E$  into  $p$  1-bit windows;
2: for  $i = 2$  to  $m-1$  Compute  $T^i \bmod M$ ;
3:  $C := T^{V_{p-1}} \bmod M$ ;
4: for  $i := p-2$  downto  $0$  do
5:    $C := C^{2^1} \bmod M$ ;
6:   if  $V_i \neq 0$  then  $C := C \times T^{V_i} \bmod M$ ;
7: return  $C$ ;
End.

```

The hardware that implements the  $m$ -ary method, presented in Algorithm 6, is described in Figure 7. The first or *pre-processing* step (Line 2) computes all the possible powers of  $T$ , with respect to the partition size  $l$ , and stores them in a local memory (MEM). Later on, i.e. in the second or exponentiation step (Line 3 to 6), each partition of the exponent  $E$  will be used to address the memory to obtain the pre-computed power of  $T$ .




Figure 7: The architecture of the  $m$ -ary hardware

There is no need to store  $T^0 \bmod M$ , since zero partitions are not considered (see Line 6 of Algorithm 6). The first power of  $T$ , i.e.  $T^2 \bmod M$ , is computed by passing  $T$  through both multiplexers  $MUX_1$  and  $MUX_4$ , feeding the modular multiplier (MODMULT). The result is then stored in location 2 of MEM, using the initial value of register  $REG_1$ . This register is responsible for generating the power memory addresses during the pre-processing step. The subsequent possible power powers are obtained, successively, by passing the previous result through multiplexer  $MUX_3$  then  $MUX_1$ . Note that  $T$  is kept available through multiplexer  $MUX_4$ . The memory locations are generated by incrementing  $REG_1$ , whenever a new address is required.

In each iteration of the exponentiation step, the partial result  $C$  is raised to the  $2^l$  power then multiplied by  $T^{V_i} \bmod M$ , when  $V_i$  is not a zero partition (see lines 5 and 6 of Algorithm 6). The values of  $T^{V_i} \bmod M$  are obtained from the power memory, according to the current partition of the exponent  $E$ . In order to obtain the

value of the current partition, we store exponent  $E$  in shift register  $REG_E$ , from which the most significant partition is retrieved to address the power memory (see line 3 and 6 of Algorithm 1). When a new partition is required, register  $REG_E$  is left-shifted  $l$  times. Recall that  $l$  represents the partition size. This operation is controlled by a down counter, initialised with  $l$  and decremented each time the register  $REG_E$  is left-shifted. Signal  $zerol$  is asserted when the down counter reaches zero. The square-and-multiply loop (starting in line 5 of Algorithm 6) consists of two main phases:

1. The first one performs  $l$  squaring of the partial result. For this purpose, the partial result is fed-back to inputs  $A$  and  $B$  of the modular multiplier of Figure 3, through multiplexers  $MUX_3$  and  $MUX_5$ , and then multiplexers  $MUX_1$  and  $MUX_4$ , respectively. The squaring operation is controlled by a down counter, which is initialised with  $l$  and decremented each time one squaring is completed;
2. The second phase performs the modular multiplication of the partial result with the pre-computed power of  $T$ , when the current partition is not zero. The power of  $T$ , i.e.  $T^{V_i}$  modulo  $M$ , is read from the power memory, at the location indicated by the most significant partition of register  $REG_E$ . The address is passed through multiplexer  $MUX_2$ .

The square-and-multiply loop is performed until the least significant partition of  $E$  is reached. This is controlled by a down counter, which is initialised with  $p$  and decremented each step of the loop. Recall that  $p$  denotes the number of partitions. Signal  $zerop$  is asserted when the down counter reaches zero. The final result is, then, loaded from  $SHIFTREGISTER_2$  in the architecture of Figure 3 into register  $REG_C$ .

### 6.3 Result Comparison

For the four systems, i.e. the software-only, the two hardware-only and the proposed co-design systems, we obtained the hardware required, where it is applicable, as well as the response time. The obtained figures are given in Table 1. The charts of Figure 8 represent the time requirements for the three considered implementations, i.e. software-only, hardware-only and hardware/software co-design implementation. It shows clearly that the software-only has the worst time whilst the hardware-only offers the best time. Moreover, it demonstrates that the response time of the mixed implementation is not that bad with respect to the best time. The mixed implementation is about 27% slower than the hardware-only ones.

<i>System</i> \ <i>Requirements</i>	<b>Hardware area</b>			<b>Response time</b>		
	512	1024	2048	512	1024	2048
<i>Software-only</i>	–	–	–	1982	3491	7255
<i>Hardware-only<sub>1</sub></i>	811	1679	2995	713	1354	2001
<i>Hardware-only<sub>2</sub></i>	1407	2220	3201	501	953	1324
<i>Mixed</i>	195	431	722	1029	1782	2209

Table 1: Hardware area (CLBs), response time (ns) and performance factor




Figure 8: Comparison of the response time for the considered implementations

The chart of Figure 9 represents the hardware area consumption for the hardware-only and the mixed implementations. Clearly, the co-design implementation requires very much less hardware than the hardware-only solution. The latter consumes about four times more hardware area than the former.




Figure 9: Comparison of the required hardware area of the considered implementations, when applicable

The chart of Figure 10 represents the performance factor  $area \times time$  for the implementations, which involve hardware, i.e. the hardware-only and the mixed implementations. It is clear from this chart that the co-design system improves a very great deal the performance factor. The improvement is about 65%.




Figure 10: Performance factor for the hardware-only and mixed implementations

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose and implement a novel solution that focuses on the two major aspects impacting on the performance of any given cryptosystems based on modular exponentiation as a non-linear function for data scrambling: (i) the number of required modular multiplications and; (ii) the modular multiplication time, without too much increase in resource requirements. To do so, we evolve, using genetic algorithms, a minimal addition chain based on which we perform the modular exponentiation. Moreover, we exploited the co-design methodology to partition the modular exponentiation into two subsystems: the hardware subsystem and the software subsystem. Given the adequate operands, the former performs a single modular multiplication. The latter coordinates the work of the hardware subsystem based on the evolutionary addition chain.

The solution proposed and implemented finds a balance between the two requirements: time and area. Furthermore, it allows one to change of the encryption and decryption key freely without any extra cost. We demonstrated that the response time of the mixed implementation is not that bad with respect to that of the hardware-only implementation. As a matter of fact, the co-design based implementation is about 27% slower than the hardware-only one. However, the mixed implementation requires very much less hardware than the hardware-only solution. The latter consumes about four times more hardware area that the former. Finally, we showed that the co-design based system improves considerably in about 65%.

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